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ABSTRACT 
Successive Mexican administrations have turned to the deployment of military and 
federal law enforcement agencies to respond to crises, recently focusing in particular on 
targeting the leaders of major drug cartels in their counternarcotics efforts.  However, 
since 2000, Mexico’s government’s efforts to control criminal activities in these cities 
have met with varying success.  During that period, the Mexican federal government has 
apprehended ten leading members of the Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), one of the 
most prolific drug trafficking organizations.  In contrast, only three major cartel leaders 
have been apprehended from the Carrillo Fuentes Organization, (CFO), another enduring 
drug trafficking organization.  This thesis draws upon theories of organization and path 
dependence to explain variation in the Mexican government’s success in arresting major 
cartel leaders.  It argues that variation between the AFO and CFO in their internal 
structures—in particular, the AFO’s low level of professionalism relative to that of the 
CFO—has facilitated the apprehension of the AFO leadership.  In terms of path 
dependence, the thesis finds that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s focus on 
the AFO is due to the legacy of a random event, the AFO predecessor’s role in the 1985 
kidnapping and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. The DEA has clung to 
this case across twenty-five years and therefore has remained focused on the AFO, in 
order to justify U.S. counterdrug efforts in Mexico.  Changing U.S.-Mexico relations 
have facilitated the DEA’s focus on the AFO, particularly since 2000.   
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Since Vicente Fox won the 2000 Mexican Presidential election, Mexican federal 
agencies such as the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI), the Protective Federal Police, 
and the Mexican military—including elements of the Navy and Marines as well as the 
Special Air Mobile Force Group (Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales or GAFES)—
have taken the lead in Mexico’s “war” on drugs.  This war has been fought against drug 
cartels and the corruption of local and regional officials, including the local police in 
Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Juarez, which have at various times been hotspots of 
violence as cartels compete for control of the major U.S.-Mexican border crossings (often 
referred to as plazas).  
However, state efforts to control criminal activities in these cities have met with 
varying success.  Since 2000, the Mexican federal government has apprehended at least 
eight leading members of the Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), one of the most 
prolific drug trafficking organizations with control of the Tijuana border crossings.1  Yet 
during the same period of time, only three major cartel leaders have been apprehended 
from the Juarez Cartel (known also as the Carrillo Fuentes Organization, CFO), another 
enduring drug trafficking organization in control of the Ciudad Juarez border crossing.  
We observe this variation in spite of similarities between the two cities in terms of their 
size, access to American markets, and relative importance to the free flow of Mexican 
goods across the border. This thesis seeks to explain this variation in the Mexican 
government’s success in apprehending AFO and CFO leaders as well as the across-time 
variation—i.e., the increased success since 2000. 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that while this thesis analyzes the variation observed in captures of the leaders 
of these two drug trafficking organizations, some of the discussion places significance on the DTO’s 
relative geographic centers of control and the federal governments attempts to increase state control of 
these areas.  This focus of this thesis resides at the federal level; it does not attempt to analyze variations on 
a local level, which remains a possibility for future research. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
As Mexico continues its process of democratization, it continues encountering 
tremendous challenges to its ability to control its territory, fight widespread corruption, 
and combat challenges to the state—i.e., its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force.”2   In confronting these challenges to its control, the government has routinely 
engaged in behavior that runs counter to democratic practices—including, for instance, 
human rights violations by state security forces and corruption at all levels of 
government—at the same time that it has sought to capture the leadership of these cartels.  
Given these very real challenges to security and democracy in Mexico, identifying and 
weighing factors that help to explain the government’s successes in cartel leadership 
captures may allow policymakers to make more balanced and informed decisions in a 
more effective prosecution of criminal organizations while mitigating those elements that 
contradict the progress of democratization in Mexico.  
C. OVERVIEW 
In 2000, President Fox and the National Action Party (PAN) defeated the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and broke the multitude of alliances that had 
existed between the government and drug cartels for over 70 years.3  This schism not 
only destroyed many of the existing alliances between government leaders and the 
cartels, but the democratization process has also created opportunities for Mexican 
officials to initiate reforms to combat corruption.  Under the Fox administration (2000-
06), Mexico’s federal government managed to achieve some level of success against the 
AFO by way of the arrests of five high-level cartel leaders.4  Fox’s successor, Felipe 
                                                          
2 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.  
3 Luis Astorga, Drug Trafficking in Mexico; A First General Assessment, Discussion Paper. No. 36 
(Paris: Most Programme [UNESCO], 1999), 20. 
4 Leading members of the AFO arrested by Mexican military, federal police, or federal agents include 
the following individuals: Benjamin Arellano-Felix, arrested by the military in 2002; Gilberto Higuera-
Guerrero, arrested by federal agents in 2004; Efrain Perez, arrested by federal agents in 2004; Jorge 
Aureliano-Felix, arrested by federal agents in 2004; Eduard Arellano-Felix, arrested by Federal Public 
Security forces in 2008, Gustavo Rivera Martinez arrested in 2008 by Mexican law enforcement; Rigoberto 
Yanez Guerrero arrested by the PGR in 2001, and Teodoro Garcia Simental, arrested by federal agents in 
2010. 
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Calderon (2006-present), went one step further in his campaign against corruption and 
the drug trafficking organizations to deploy thousands of troops across the country in the 
days following his inauguration an effort that has also resulted in the arrest of three of the 
remaining leaders of the cartel.   
The same success cannot be said for the government’s efforts against the CFO; 
over the same period, CFO leadership has gone largely untouched by the Mexican 
government and continues to assert control of the plaza in Juarez, though that control is 
contested on an ongoing basis by other drug cartels.  The Mexican federal government 
(specifically, units of the Federal Public Security agency) only recently arrested Vicente 
Carrillo Leyva, a key member of CFO,5 in Mexico City.  With relative similarities 
between the cities in size, demographics, access to the lucrative U.S. markets, and federal 
agency responses, why have there been so many key AFO leaders arrested relative to the 
case of the CFO?   
In the context of this thesis, “success” is defined by the government’s capture and 
subsequent incarceration of the major leaders of these cartels.  The capture of these 
leaders is a single key indicator that politicians and governmental agencies can point to as 
success to the public on the government’s war on drugs.6   
The thesis explains the Mexican government’s varied success in capturing cartel 
leaders from the two cartels by pointing to two key factors. First, certain cartel structures 
and behaviors make it easier for law enforcement actors to capitalize upon by exploiting 
information gained by the arrest of one member to provide information about others.  
Second, and most important, the thesis identifies the role that the U.S. government has 
                                                          
5 Vicente Carillo Leyva is the nephew of the head of the Juarez Cartel, Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes.  He 
was arrested in April 2009.   
6 There is extensive literature on the varied methods used by governments in estimating failures of the 
drug trade such as the street price of cocaine, its purity, and amounts interdicted.  For elaboration on these 
methods see Vanda Felbab-Brown. “Counternarcotics Policy Overview: Global Trends & Strategies.” 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2008; National Drug Intelligence Agency. “National Drug Threat 
Assessment, 2009” http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/index.htm; Washington D.C.: National Drug 
Intelligence Agency, 2008; Office of National Drug Control Policy. “Cocaine Smuggling in 2007,” 
Washington D.C.: ONDCP, 2007; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. “Cocaine Price/Purity Analysis 
of STRIDE Data,” Washington D.C.: U.S. DEA 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/cocaine_prices_purity.html; and WOLA. “Connecting the Dots 
ONDCP’s (Reluctant) Update on Cocaine Price and Purity.” Washington D.C.: Washington Office on Latin 
America, 2007. 
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played in Mexico’s war against drugs.  U.S.-Mexico security collaboration has evolved 
dramatically since the mid-1980s.  Since the death of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agent in 
1985 and Mexico’s increased security ties (as a byproduct of increased economic 
integration through NAFTA as well as the fall of the ruling PRI in 2000),7 the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) has relentlessly pursued their agent’s killers, 
focusing intensively on the AFO over other cartels.  DEA behavior has therefore 
followed a path-dependent logic, whereby a single “random” event—the death of the 
DEA agent—triggered a long-term focus on the perpetrators and their organization. The 
DEA’s pursuit of the AFO since the killing of the DEA agent in 1985 has been facilitated 
by two important shifts in U.S.-Mexico relations: the negotiations and signing of NAFTA 
in 1992 and President Fox’s election in 2000.  Understanding these two events is critical 
to explaining why we witness the systematic apprehension of AFO leaders two decades 
after the death the DEA agent.  The DEA’s focus on AFO has had direct implications for 
the behavior of Mexican federal law enforcement agencies, which have benefited directly 
from DEA activities in Mexico.  The DEA is able to assist foreign governments in five 
different law enforcement areas,8 two of which directly impact Mexico’s ability to 
apprehend cartel leaders: intelligence gathering and bilateral investigations.  And since 
the DEA has focused its attentions on the AFO, Mexican agencies have been able to 
apprehend the leaders of that cartel.   
The CFO, heretofore, has lacked such a critical juncture in their history like that 
of the 1985 killing of the DEA agent and therefore have not attracted such tenacious 
pursuit by U.S. law enforcement agencies.  Until the March 16, 2010, killings of two U.S. 
consulate employees in Juarez—incidents that occurred long after the 1985 killing of the 
DEA agent and therefore long after the DEA was set on its “path” of obsession with the  
 
                                                          
7 Peter Andreas, “Building Bridges and Barricades” in Transnational Crime and Public Security: 
Challenges to Mexico and the United States, edited by John Bailey and Jorge Chabat, (San Diego: Center 
for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 2002), 199.  
8 The DEA’s Foreign Cooperative Investigation program consists of five different law enforcement 
areas:  international training; foreign liaisons, institution building; intelligence gathering, and bilateral 
investigations.  Intelligence gathering and bilateral investigations provide direct assistance to host nations 
in their investigations of drug traffickers. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.  “Foreign Cooperative 
Investigations,” n.d.. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/fci.htm on June 11, 2010. 
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AFO—there has been no impetus on the U.S. to commit vast (both real and political) 
resources to a venture that may not produce the results already achieved in fighting the 
AFO.9  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis draws on three main bodies of literature to provide background on 
Mexico’s political and security reality and to explain (1) across-time variation—i.e., why 
we have observed a marked increase in captures since 2000—and (2) variation in 
Mexican state captures of AFO versus CFO leaders.  
In terms of across-time variation, analysis of Reames (2007), Freeman and Sierra 
(2005), and Schaefer et al. (2009) provide an overview of the Mexican federal 
government’s different agencies—both civilian and military—tasked with investigating 
and capturing cartel members and analyze reforms that have improved those agencies’ 
capacity in performing this work.  The thesis also draws on research about U.S.-Mexican 
relations to show how improved relations have facilitated increased flows in resources 
from the U.S. government to Mexican agencies, further increasing the Mexican 
government’s ability to capture cartel leaders. 
Importantly, the thesis takes seriously the complex and sometimes contradictory 
goals of strengthening democracy and decreasing criminal activity. It draws on Lopez 
Portillo’s work, which asserts that the primary mandate of Mexico’s police has been to 
support political loyalty, which is guaranteed through an agreement that ensures police 
impunity.  Lopez Portillo argues that this mutually beneficial agreement allows law 
enforcement to maintain autonomy while ensuring political power for the regime.  Law 
enforcement’s political mandate takes precedence even over providing public security, a 
dynamic that erodes the social contract between the police and the community.10  
                                                          
9 The murder of the three individuals tied to the U.S. Consulate in Juarez, may well provide the 
motivation for the U.S. Justice department to dedicate more law enforcement resources and effort to the 
pursuit of organized crime elements in the Juarez region. However, the path-dependent argument put forth 
here predicts that the DEA will remain on the same “path” of focusing on the AFO.    
10 The social contract between police and the populace is generally mutually beneficial whereby the 
police enforce socially acceptable rules (mandated by popular consensus) and the population supports the 
police with information on the activities in their jurisdiction. 
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Because of this erosion, Mexican officials run the risk of drawing the wrong lessons by 
responding to crime by “immediately and exponentially increasing the resources assigned 
to the police and the justice system.”11   
In addition to addressing the question of state capacity and across-time change in 
Mexican government successes against cartel leaders, the thesis also seeks to explain 
variation in leadership captures between the AFO and CFO. It draws on theories of 
organizations focused on networks, professionalism, and specialization, to help explain 
why AFO leaders have been more susceptible to arrests than CFO leaders. It argues that 
the CFO’s greater degree of specialization and professionalism has meant that CFO 
leaders have been relatively insulated from other components of the CFO organization, 
which has, in turn, protected them from captures through informant chains.  
1. State Security Overview 
State capacity, or what Corrales refers to as stateness, is the state’s ability to 
formulate and implement policy (essentially, the state’s ability to impose its will), extract 
revenues (via taxes), create and maintain links to the international community, and 
govern the economy.12  At the law enforcement end, this capacity constitutes the 
composition, capabilities (reflective of the training and equipping of those forces), and 
organization of the majority of the government’s agencies.  For decades, Mexican 
presidents have relied on the military to bolster federal law enforcement units for 




                                                          
11  Luis Armando Gonzalez Plascencia, “Hacia un modelo democratico de seguridad cuidadana: entre 
la justicia civica y el sistema penal,” in Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges to Mexico 
and the United States, ed. John Bailey and Jorge Chabat,  (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at 
the University of California, San Diego, 2002), 114. 
12  Javier Corrales, “Market Reforms,” in Jorge Dominguez and Michael Shifter’s Constructing 
Democratic Governance in Latin America, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2003), 76. 
13 Mexico deployed troops in response to the Zapatista’s Movement in 1994, in drug eradication 
efforts since the 1940s, and to combat organized crime and corruption specifically since 2006. 
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provide a “surge” capacity has gained some proponents throughout Mexico as an 
effective security option in difficult times including human rights ombudsman Jose Luis 
Soberanes.14   
Mexico’s security structure is a complex, overlapping entanglement of 
jurisdictions of over 1,600 independent law enforcement forces, not including the 
military.  Drug interdiction falls under the auspices of the Secretaries of National 
Defense, the Navy, the Interior, and Public Security, and with state and local police, but 
investigations of drug-related crime is the responsibility of municipal police and the 
Federal Agency of Investigation (AFI).15  The sheer numbers of agencies greatly 
complicate the efforts of law enforcement agencies to share information much less 
analyze multiple reports from separate sources on specific individuals.
16
   Public funding 
of Mexican law enforcement may also contribute to its ineffectiveness, concentrating its 
resources on technology and equipment as opposed to training and salaries.  In Mexico 
City, a beat police earns around $700 a month, and yet the city pays its pay roll personnel 
$900 a month,17 a disparity that facilitates ease of corrupting of the city police by the 
cartels. While this disparity may not automatically translate to variation between the two 
cities, it is worth noting as a source of potential liability for the Mexican government.  
These challenges to Mexican law enforcement each contribute directly or indirectly to 
increases in effectiveness the government may have gained through these changes.18   
                                                          
14 Ken Ellingwood. Mexico vs. Drug Gangs: A Deadly Clash for Control,  Los Angeles Times. June 3, 
2008. 
15 It is also important to note that the Protective Federal Police (PFP) and the AFI have merged into 
one organization under the Secretary of Public Safety.  Bahney, Benjamin, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and 
Jack K. Riley. “Security in Mexico.” Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: The Rand 
Corporation, 2009, 15–18.   
16 Perhaps the most notable recent example of this has been the 9/11 Commission Report’s depiction 
of the various U.S. agencies with individual pieces of information regarding the attacks (such as not watch-
listing Hamzi and Mihdhar or connecting Zacarias Moussaoui to a possible future attack) but with no one 
agency able to put enough of the information together in order to stop the attacks.  9/11 Commission . “9/11 
Commission Report Executive Summary.” Washington D.C.: W.W. Norton & Company, July 22, 2004, 8–
9. 
17 Schaefer et al. Security in Mexico, 15. 
18 Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, “Mexico: The Militarization Trap,” in Drugs and 
Democracy In Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., 2005), 263. 
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It is important to note that this thesis (particularly Chapter II) focuses on 
Mexico’s federal law enforcement system.  This thesis does not provide an analysis of 
local level variations that exist between the many law municipal enforcement agencies.  
These variations include but are not limited to the education, training, and pay rates of 
their officers.  The variations can and likely do have implications on the variation seen in 
Mexico’s apprehensions of the leaders of the CFO and AFO. 
Reames (2007), Freeman and Sierra (2005), and Schaefer et al. (2009) provide 
extensive overviews of the many transformations Mexico’s security apparatuses have 
undergone over the last two decades. Most of these attempts at security reform have been 
directed at reducing the level of corruption in Mexico’s security forces.  A few of the 
reforms have been aimed at otherwise professionalizing those same forces, from human 
rights training to structural changes to clarify command and control mechanisms.  These 
reforms are critical to the overall evolution of a transparent and effective Mexican 
security apparatus.  However, while federal security reforms are a necessary condition for 
long-term security reform, they are not sufficient to explain success in captures of AFO 
leaders relative to the CFO leaders. 
2. Cartel Structures and Behaviors 
Due to the illicit nature of the activities of organized crime, there is a relative 
dearth of academic literature to explain the organizational structures of drug trafficking 
organizations.  Michael Kenney provides a unique view into the network structures of 
Colombian drug cartels prominent in the 1980s, yet these structures do not capture the 
key characteristics of the AFO and CFO that ultimately help to explain the variation of 
interest across the cartels. Moving beyond Kenney, this thesis turns to other theories of 
organizations, from the tradition of public administration theory, to help to explain the 
varied success of cartel leader captures.  
In From Pablo to Osama, Kenney provides an organizational theory approach to 
understanding how drug traffickers and terrorist organizations learn.19  According to 
                                                          
19 Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama (University City, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2007). 
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Kenney, the structural and functional make up of drug trafficking organizations are 
designed to be adaptive and flexible in order to achieve a “competitive advantage” over 
law enforcement agencies, maintaining security while maximizing their capacity to 
smuggle drugs.20   
In this analysis, Kenney argues that structures of these networks are based 
primarily upon the need for security of operation (while maintaining necessary methods 
for communication) and are therefore compartmentalized to prevent the loss of any 
particular node of the trade from collapsing the organization as a whole.  For example, in 
a hierarchical organization, the loss of a key leader with a monopoly on the inner-
workings of that organization may lead to the collapse of the organization.  In contrast, in 
a loose, decentralized network, each node of the organization may know members of the 
organization on each end of their particular piece of the trade, but may be removed from 
knowing anything about the trade beyond their small piece.  However, it often takes 
longer to reconstitute the sections of these enterprises lost to law enforcement or 
otherwise.21  In reality, and different from the Colombian cartels that Kenney models, the 
AFO and CFO are essentially comprised of a loose combination of the two structures 
with a fairly hierarchical upper-management structure and a decentralized network of 
lower-level traffickers. 
According to Kenney, the cartels are organized according to one of two models of 
networks, “wheel networks” and “chain networks,” and they also vary in their degree of 
vertical accountability and responsibilities.22  This variation in cartel structure may create 
critical vulnerabilities for cartels that do not effectively compartmentalize their 
operations.  Some DTOs utilize a chain network that is horizontally accountable, whereby 
each node of the organization may only know individuals in one or two other nodes out 
of many.  Other DTOs employ a wheel network that provides a number of vertically 
accountable levels.  Wheel networks may include individuals that are aware of multiple 
nodes of the operation and may also use trusted individuals as a protective barrier to the 
                                                          
20 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 27. 
21 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 31. 
22 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 29. 
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leaders of the organization in the event that lower level agents are apprehended.23  
However, arrests of even trusted individuals can provide information that leads to further 
arrests by the intelligence gathered through evidence collection, i.e., cell phones, notes, 
receipts, etc.  While each of these structures provides certain advantages and 
disadvantages, the horizontal accountability provided by chain networks remain “more 
resistant to head hunting approaches to drug control: there are no ‘high value’ core group 
leaders for law enforcers to capture, and those participants who are detained are generally 
easy to replace.”24   
Applying Kenney’s research to the AFO and CFO offers an explanation of how 
variations in structures facilitates the Mexican government’s relative success against the 
AFO.  Consistent with predictions from Kenney’s study, a number of analyses of the 
CFO suggest that the cartel turns to what amount to subcontractors to carry out some 
functions.  Specifically, La Linea, Barrio Aztecas, and Los Linces organizations provide 
the CFO with specific capabilities and services.  La Linea is an enforcement arm of the 
CFO and is comprised of active and former police, often from the Ciudad Juarez area.  
The unique access to the local law enforcement allows La Linea to provide warning to 
other members of the CFO and its associates of impending government actions against 
the CFO.25  Barrio Aztecas is an American prison gang that has been involved in 
enforcement and trafficking for the CFO.  Members of Barrio Aztecas typically operate 
on the U.S. side of the border but have been involved increasingly on the Mexican side.26  
Los Linces represents the enforcement arm of Barrio Aztecas and remains in connection 
with the CFO.  The evolution of specialized units that focus on enforcement is a 
relatively new occurrence in the Mexican drug trade.  These connections between the 
CFO and outside organizations likely provide additional security to the leadership of the 
                                                          
23 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 27. 
24 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 31. 
25 U.S. Consulate Worker in Juarez was Targeted for Assassination,” Salem News, May 4, 2010; 
“Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence,” STRATFOR, 2008, 7–8. 
26 The 2010 killing of three people tied to the U.S. Consulate in Juarez has been connected to 
members of the Barrio Aztecas.  Ricardo “Chino” Valles de la Rosa, a member of the Aztecas, was arrested 
on suspicion of being a lookout for the assassins.   James C. McKinley.  “Suspect Says Juarez Killers Had 
Pursued Jail Guard,” New York Times, March 31, 2010. 
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organization and can therefore help explain why Mexican law enforcement agencies have 
captured relatively few CFO leaders.27  While Kenney does not consider the possibility 
for such subcontracting in his analysis of the structures of Colombian Cartels in the 
1990s, the dynamic is definitely congruent with his point that these organizations learn 
and adapt to their operational environments. 
Given that Kenney’s analysis of networks does not satisfactorily explain the 
variation of concern, this thesis draws on other theories of organization, within the 
tradition of public administration theory, to understand the relevance of cartel structures. 
First, the thesis finds that the CFO’s greater level of professionalism has helped to protect 
its leaders from capture. In The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington delineates 
the differences between “amateurs” in a given profession and “professionals,” noting that 
amateurs have traditionally been viewed as monetarily motivated whereas professionals 
are moved by a “higher calling.”28  He goes on to elaborate on the roles “expertise,” 
“responsibility” and “corporateness” play in the level of professionalism found in modern 
soldiers.29  Applying Huntington to the AFO and CFO, this thesis finds that the AFO’s 
less professional structure—specifically, one in which family and friendship ties are more 
important than professional background or skill level for membership and assignments—
means that law enforcement agents are able to utilize information gained from the arrest 
of one member of the cartel’s leadership for follow-on investigations of other key leaders.  
Conversely, by maintaining a more professional organization, the CFO is able to limit the 
information gained from any single member of the organization. 
Huntington’s point on “expertise” becomes increasingly salient when viewed 
through Gulick and Urwick’s discussions on the benefits of specialization in 
                                                          
27 “Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence”, STRATFOR, (2008), 7–8.  
Daniel Borunda, “‘Lynxes,’ Azteca formed hit squad: Birthday party attack directed by cartel, gang,” El 
Paso Times. February 11, 2010. 
28  Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 7–8. 
29 Importantly, DTOs do not fulfill all of Huntington’s requirements for a professional organization. 
Huntington ties the responsibility of the individuals to the “greater good” of society and argues financial 
compensation “cannot be the primary aim of the professional man.” 
29 In contrast, participating in the trafficking of narcotics is done for the prospect of earning money for 
taking on the risks associated with the trade, such as incarceration and death. 
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organizations.  Specialization distributes disparate activities within an organization 
between departments.30  This allows various departments (or in the case of DTOs, cells) 
to consolidate homogenous activities.31 It creates units capable of providing relative 
expertise through repetition of unique capabilities.32  Specialization also reduces the 
transaction costs of units having to shift to heterogeneous activities regularly.  DTOs, like 
corporations are likely to benefit from savings in the form of transaction and training 
costs in the long run.  This is especially true when they are able to form specialized units 
that increase a unit’s expertise in a particular skill and reduce the costs of reforming 
critical contacts and agreements with outside agents.  Specialization appears to be more 
readily manifest in the CFO construct with associated criminal organizations that provide 
specific capabilities and activities to the CFO (as demonstrated by the CFO’s practice of 
subcontracting, discussed above).  In contrast, it appears that members of the AFO 
perform various functions, without specializing.  This thesis finds that the CFO’s use of 
La Linea, Barrio Aztecas, and Los Linces provide specialized skill sets (and hence 
expertise in those areas) that increase efficiency as well as access to useful contacts that 
can be used to protect the organization.  
3. The Path-Dependent Nature of U.S. Drug Policy in Mexico 
The thesis draws mainly on theories of path dependence to explain DEA behavior 
and, in turn, variation in Mexican government successes in AFO versus CFO leadership 
captures. Specifically, consistent with the central idea behind path dependency, the thesis 
argues that the random event of the 1985 assassination of the DEA agent in Tijuana set 
the DEA on a “path,” focusing to the present more on the AFO than on other cartels, 
irrespective of the high levels of activity and violence of other cartels since then.   
To illustrate the logic of path dependence, we can look to Boas’ work, which 
draws on the example of the QWERTY keyboard to illustrate how patterns can resist 
                                                          
30 W. Richard Scott, Organizations Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, Fifth (Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 42. 
31 Scott. Organizations Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 42. 
32  Luther Gullick and L. Urwick, Papers on the Science of Administration (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1937), in Scott, Organizations Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 42. 
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change over time.33  The QWERTY keyboard was initially developed in 1867 to lower 
the occurrence of jammed typebars by placing common letter pairs on opposite sides of 
the typewriter.  Over time and technological advancements such as the personal computer 
the issue of jammed keys became moot, yet the QWERTY keyboard has persisted.  
Resistant to even incremental change, moving even a single key would result in 
tremendous efficiency costs of retraining countless individuals already proficient on the 
QWERTY-style keyboard. 
Utilizing Boas’ contributions to the theory of path dependency, this thesis 
demonstrates how the DEA has become “locked in” to their pursuit of the AFO.34  
Following the death of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena, the agency launched a 
massive investigation in Mexico to capture his killers.  This investigation led the DEA to 
the leaders of the Guadalajara Cartel, one of which (Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo) was 
related to the Arellano-Felix family that was to inherit the remnants of the cartel 
following the arrest of Gallardo.  This relationship, in conjunction with the DEA’s 
adoption of the Camarena narrative as an influential motivate, directed the DEA toward a 
relentless pursuit of the AFO.    
The individual hypotheses do not necessarily provide a single, “silver bullet” 
answer to the question of governmental success in capturing leaders of the AFO. 
However, when viewed as an evolutionary history of the contest with each side 
responding in kind to the actions of the other, this analysis points to a confluence of 
events, the killing of a DEA agent and subsequent path dependency of the DEA to that 
narrative combined with the tightly linked structures of the AFO, that has lead to the 
arrests of the leaders of the AFO. 
                                                          
33 Taylor C. Boas. “Conceptualizing Continuity and Change: The Composite-Standard Model of Path 
Dependence,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 19(1), Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, and New 
Delhi, 2007, 35. 
34 Paul Pierson.  “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review 94(2), 2000, 251–67, in Boas.  “Conceptualizing Continuity and Change: The Composite-
Standard Model of Path Dependence,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 19(1), Sage Publications, London, 
Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi, 2007, 33–35. 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis was conducted by way of a comparative case analysis in 
order to study the variables involved in generating successful capture operations of the 
major leaders of drug trafficking organizations.  Each case will be investigated 
individually for the role of each theoretical proposition to explain the Mexican 
government’s success against the AFO and their lack of success against the CFO.  Any 
findings of this thesis will then be evaluated in the hopes of creating a better 
understanding of the critical elements necessary to prosecute further capture operations.   
There are intrinsic difficulties that reside with the study of illicit activities.  Not 
only are these activities performed outside the view of the public at large, but they are 
also concealed and protected from attempts by researchers to shed light upon them.  
Keeping their activities in the dark is a logical action that allows DTOs to continue to 
operate and make money while remaining out of the view of law enforcement efforts.  On 
the other hand, many law enforcement efforts are also kept from view of their adversaries 
and the general public, and a similar logic follows.  Any information gleaned from efforts 
to interrupt the operations of the DTOs provides an opportunity for adapting to these 
efforts by DTOs so that they can remain free from incarceration and continue to practice 
their trade.  The secretive nature of both sides of this cat and mouse game make research 
difficult, but there remain a number of sources of information that may shed light on 
these various activities.   
1. State Security Overview 
Understanding the Mexican government’s law enforcement capacity and 
challenges (as they apply to this thesis) was conducted through an analysis of the federal 
government’s various agencies - specifically the Federal Preventative Police (PFP), the 
AFI, and the military.  The analysis of these agencies focuses on the reforms, structures, 
size, composition, and gives an overview of the deployments of federal agencies to 
regions such as the plazas in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.  Other factors considered were 
the levels of interoperability and the sharing of information between agencies.  
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Interoperability and information sharing is determined through an examination of the 
numbers of arrests and interdictions made by multiple agencies working together.   
2. Cartel Structures and Behaviors 
An explicit perspective of the operations, structures, rules, and routines of 
prominent DTOs and particularly specific cartels such as the AFO or CFO may be 
impossible to gain without direct access to core members of both organizations.  Even 
with direct access to the group, it may remain impossible to gain the fidelity of 
information that is sought by researchers because of the compartmentalization that occurs 
within these organizations.  However, it is possible to review research and interviews 
previously conducted by academics and law enforcement agents following the 
incarceration of individuals that have participated in the various activities associated with 
narcotics trafficking.  There have been a number of insightful additions to the literature in 
recent years. However, the bulk of the work is done by primary source reports from 
various news media outlets and is hampered even further by the fact that much of this 
reporting is done in the United States, as many Mexican journalists have come under fire 
by the cartels and government alike for their coverage of the Mexican war on drugs.35   
3. The Path-Dependent Nature of U.S. Drug Policy in Mexico 
Evaluating the influences that the United States, specifically the DEA has played 
in Mexico’s war against the cartels, it is evident that a review of U.S. strategies36 is 
critically important.  Equally important is a review of the interviews, testimonies, and 
media reports that depict the arrests and indictments of various high-level members of  
 
 
                                                          
35 Tracy Wilkenson. “Mexico crime reporters face deadly perils.” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 
2009. 
36  Two recent U.S. government documents provide overviews of U.S. strategies on the border: Office 
of National Drug Control Policy, “U.S. National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2009,” 
ONDCP, Washington D.C. 2009.  House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Investigations, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border,” House Committee on 
Homeland Security, Washington D.C. 2006.   
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government, including the military, law enforcement agencies, and politicians that have 
been either associated in some way with either the Tijuana Cartel or the Juarez Cartel or 
aligned against either cartel.   
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis begins by providing a detailed background of the complicated nature 
of the Mexican security structures as well as the many attempts at reform these 
institutions have undergone, primarily aimed at fighting corruption.  Chapter III analyzes 
variation in the structures and behaviors of the two DTOs that have potential 
ramifications for the government’s varied success in capturing CFO and AFO leaders. 
Chapter IV assesses the impact U.S.-Mexican relations have had on the capture of cartel 
leaders in the two cases and the path-dependent nature of the U.S. DEA’s pursuit of the 
AFO.  The thesis concludes with a synopsis of the critical findings of the research 
conducted for this project. 
Chapter II refers to Reames (2007, Freeman and Sierra (2005), and Schaefer et al. 
(2009) for an overview of Mexico’s security structures and the historical background of 
the many reforms that have been implemented over the last two decades.  Lopez Portillo 
(2002) imparts a critical lesson on how political security has undermined the social 
contract between Mexican police and the population they are charged with protecting.  
Chapter III provides a review of Michael Kenney’s examination of the networks 
and structures of the Colombian cartels prominent in the 1980s offers some insights into 
the various structures that make up the two organizations.  It then moves to Samuel 
Huntington’s theory on the professionalization of modern military officers found in his 
1957 book The Soldier and the State that provides another opportunity to partially 
explain variation that exists between the AFO and the CFO.  Chapter III concludes 
following a review of the contribution of “specialization” as it applies to organizational 
administrative theory that has relevance to the behaviors of DTOs found in Gulick and 
Urwick’s 1937 Papers on the Science of Administration. 
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Chapter IV uses theories of path-dependency to illustrate how the U.S. DEA 
became dependent upon a single critical moment of the organizations theory.  The 
chapter also highlights the evolution of U.S.-Mexico relations and how they have affected 
the local-level variations in leadership arrests.  The two critical moments that help 
explain the across-time variation in leadership arrests: the signing of NAFTA; and the 
election of President Fox, signaling the fall of the PRI.   
The thesis concludes with a summary of significant findings.  This thesis utilizes 
elements of organization and path dependence theories to explain variation in the 
Mexican government’s success in arresting key cartel leaders.  The findings hold several 
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II. STATE SECURITY OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A study of Mexico’s federal security apparatuses and the many reforms they have 
undergone over the years fails to provide adequate explanation for Mexico’s success in 
apprehending leaders of the AFO.  This chapter focuses on Mexico’s federal agencies, as 
they have been primarily responsible for the preponderance (ten out of twelve) of 
leadership arrests between the two cartels.37  It analyzes the relationships among the 
agencies as well as government efforts to reduce corruption within them. 
An examination of Mexico’s federal law enforcement entities (to include the 
military) is warranted especially in light of how often these agencies have been used in 
response to crises.  Since the 1970s, Mexican administrations have deployed the military 
in such cases.  Vicente Fox’s inauguration marked the beginning of the militarization of 
federal law enforcement with the appointment of General Rafael Macedo as Attorney 
General.  Felipe Calderon followed suit with the deployment of 45,000 troops and 
thousands of federal agents throughout Mexico to combat drug trafficking.   
This chapter focuses on an overview of Mexico’s federal security apparatuses to 
provide an understanding of the complexity of these systems.  The concentration on these 
forces is derived largely from the fact that these are the units largely responsible for the 
apprehensions of the leaders of the cartels.  Federal law enforcement not only has 
competence over federal crimes (such as drug trafficking) but since the cartels are not 
limited to any specific geographic area, federal units are often the only agencies that can 
traverse state and municipal jurisdictional boundaries.38  The chapter, unfortunately, does 
not provide a similar analysis of local-level variation that may have implications in the 
                                                          
37 These numbers include only those members of the organizations that were apprehended in Mexico, 
by Mexican authorities and have definitive membership in the organizations.  For these reasons, Heriberto 
Santilan Tabares, Ramon Arellano-Felix, and Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix  are not included in these 
figures. 
38 It is important to note that while the cartels control specific plazas (such as Tijuana and Juarez) and 
tend to be thought of as geographically tied to those areas, the leaders of these cartels are not.  In fact all 
but three arrests of the leaders of these two cartels were made outside Tijuana and Juarez. 
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variation witnessed in arrest levels of the AFO leadership relative the CFO leadership.  
An analysis of the municipal or state security forces provides another possible avenue for 
further research.  
Though knowledge of the nature of Mexico’s federal security apparatuses is 
important to provides background on captures, including an understanding of how 
Mexico’s government has attempted to reform these systems critical to the prosecution of 
the war on drugs, it does not explain variation between the AFO and CFO in terms of 
state arrests of leaders. In fact, to the extent to which federal agencies have focused more 
on one cartel, it would be the CFO, the leadership of which has largely evaded arrest. 
Provided that an increase in security agents in a given region generally increases state 
capacity, it seems rational to expect a corresponding increase of arrests of individuals, to 
include the leaders of the cartels.  However, these are not the results that are observed.  
Despite the disparity in law enforcement agents in favor of the Juarez region, Mexico’s 
success in apprehensions still resides with its focus on the AFO. Nearly six thousand 
troops and another two thousand federal agents have been deployed to Ciudad Juarez 
since 2009.  In Tijuana, the Mexican government deployed 3,300 soldiers and federal 
agents in 2007;39 this number was increased to just over four thousand in 2010.  This 
means that for the last three years there have been more than twice as many federal law 
enforcement agents in the Juarez area than there have been in Tijuana.40   However, the 
arrest records of cartel leadership do not reflect any correlation between an increase in 
numbers of agents and an increased number of arrests of high-ranking individuals.   
Importantly, a greater concentration of public security forces does not necessarily 
suggest greater security in a given region. Public calls for increased security (as indicated 
above) often results in increases in law enforcement resources.  However, these are the 
same entities that Lopez Portillo argues have traditionally been used in Mexico to protect 
                                                          
39 The initial deployment consisted of 2,620 soldiers, 162 marines, and 510 federal police. 
40 Considering the military is being used as an arm of law enforcement in Mexico, it stands to reason 
that they are also referred to as “law enforcement agents.” 
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not the populace, but the political regime.41  Gomez Cespedes highlights the tremendous 
challenges facing any administration seeking reform when “corrupt politicians, 
businessmen, and commanders of the police and the army, who as a rule were primary 
actors in criminal organizations.”42      
At issue with the deployment of military troops to confront corruption is the 
systemic failure of the social contract between law enforcement and the populace.  A 
1999 public opinion poll conducted in Mexico City found seventy percent of the 
population did not trust the police and believed that they are connected to crime, 
indicating a significant distrust of law enforcement.  Lopez Portillo extrapolates this 
finding to a related hypothesis that the police themselves are creating insecurity.43  By 
extension, the deployment of large numbers of law enforcement agents exacerbates the 
security situation.  This is particularly true if those agents have not reformed with public 
safety as their primary mandate as opposed to their traditional mandate of protecting the 
political regime. 
With these caveats in mind, the present chapter proceeds as follows.  Beginning 
with an overview of Mexico’s law enforcement structures to include the size and 
jurisdictions of those agencies as well as their recent history and reforms, the chapter then 
proceeds through an overview of the civilian federal agencies.  This is followed by a 
similar treatment of Mexico’s military structures and their role in the war on drugs. The 
final section provides a brief discussion of how these agencies are affected by corruption 
before concluding.   
                                                          
41 Ernesto Lopez Portillo Vargas, “The Police in Mexico: Political Functions and Needed Reforms,” 
in Chabat and Bailey, Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges to Mexico and the United 
States, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 2002.110–111  
42 Gomez Cespedes, Alejandra.  “The Dynamics of Organized Crime in Mexico” (Ph D. dissertation, 
Cardiff University, 1998), in Chabat and Bailey, Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges to 
Mexico and the United States, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego 
2002, 121. 
43 Lopez Portillo. “The Police in Mexico,” 120. 
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B. MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE AND RECENT 
HISTORY 
Vicente Fox’s election and subsequent fracturing of the PRI’s stranglehold on 
government institutions tore down the patron-client control mechanisms the party had 
maintained for nearly seventy years.  Mexican law enforcement, in particular, has been 
beset at all levels with massive corruption and collaboration, which, in turn, has 
undermined the public’s view of these apparatuses.  The dramatic shift following Fox’s 
election was not the first time a sitting president acknowledged Mexico’s law 
enforcement deficiencies.  Beginning with the administration of President Salinas (1988-
1994), successive executives have attempted to purge, restructure, and reorganize the 
Mexican federal law enforcement system, particularly the Attorney General’s Office 
(Procuraduria General de la Republica, PGR).  These reforms have been attempts to 
eliminate or at least diminish corruption.   
Understanding Mexican federal law enforcement’s efficacy in battling AFO and 
CFO has to begin with an understanding of Mexico’s law enforcement structures, 
jurisdictions, and mandates.  It is only after this understanding is established, including 
the reform measures the government has undertaken, that it becomes apparent that these 
entities and their reforms alter Mexico’s application of law enforcement across all of 
Mexico.  Any change in federal law enforcement in Mexico is applied equally in all 
jurisdictions; therefore these changes do not provide Mexico with variation in leadership 
arrest results.  Increased troop and federal agent levels are not likely to provide any 
Mexican administration a corresponding increase in arrest of cartel leadership.  However, 
a review of these forces and their evolution is important in formulating a full 
understanding of the complexity of Mexico’s drug war and their efforts to apprehend the 
leaders of DTOs. 
Mexico is a federation of thirty-one states and a federal district and divides its law 
enforcement system by jurisdiction and function.  Mexico divides its law enforcement 
jurisdictions into federal, state, municipal, levels as well as the Federal District, and these 
forces are also bifurcated by function.  There are preventative police, charged with 
keeping the peace, and judicial or investigative police that are responsible for 
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investigating crimes.   An overview of security structures follows, starting with a brief 
summary of the numerical size of Mexican law enforcement and then covering the topic 
of jurisdiction and finally the breakdown of the security structure via function.   
1. Size 
In deploying troops to resolve crises in troubled areas, the administrations of 
Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon have assumed that increased law enforcement presence 
will correspond with an increase in security.  According to this logic, an increase in law 
enforcement agent presence in regions most affected by organized crime can be expected 
to result in increased arrests of criminal actors, to include the leaders of these 
organizations.  Contrary to such an approach, this thesis shows that increases in law 
enforcement agents does not automatically equate to increased captures. 
There are approximately 350,000 federal, state, and municipal police officers.  
Ninety percent (317,000) of them fall under the authority of state and local authorities, 
and with the remaining ten percent (33,000) falling under the auspices of federal 
authorities.44  Mexico has approximately 370 police officers compared with the United 
State’s 225 per 100,000 people,45 which highlights the point that the size of the force is 
important but is not the defining characteristic in the application of security.46  While 
inadequate numbers of law enforcement officials often lead to overloads within the 
system and create investigative and prosecutorial backlogs, this statistic would seem to 
indicate that there should be no such backlog in Mexico’s public law enforcement 
entities.  However, this is not the case in Mexico, because the officers within the Office 
of the Public Prosecutor (OPP) charged with prosecuting reported crimes are the same 
officers responsible for investigating crimes and make up only a small fraction of 
Mexico’s security system, which limits the collection of information and possible leads 
or connections to other criminal acts. 
                                                          
44  Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney and K. Jack Riley, “Security in Mexico,” Santa 
Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: The RAND Corporation, 2009, 19. 
45 Jane’s, 2008 Jane’s Sentinel Country Assessments in Schaefer et al. “Security in Mexico,” 18. 
46 Schaefer et al., Security in Mexico, 18. 
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2. Jurisdiction 
a. Municipal Level  
Similar to counties in the United States, the municipal level of government 
represents the smallest unit of elected government granted authority through elections 
and state resources in Mexico, of which there are around 2,400 municipal governments.47  
There exists large variation within the range of municipal governments: not all of these 
municipal governments have police forces and of those that do, around 2,000 of those 
municipalities have police forces that number less than one hundred officers.  
Consequently, these police forces are not well-developed and are often not modernized 
police forces.48  However, unlike the elected sheriffs in the United States, municipal 
police chiefs in Mexico are appointed, (as is the case with U.S. county sheriffs).  Mexican 
municipalities do maintain police forces but are limited to preventive police functions, 
which consequently means they do not have investigative authority. 
b. State Level 
At the state level, the State Judicial Police (PJE) operate in each of the 31 
states and consist of preventative police (90,000 officers nationally) and judicial police 
(somewhere between 21,000 and 25,000 officers nationally).  The judicial police are 
organized under the Offices of the Attorneys General (Procuradurias Generales de 
Justicia), the state-level institution charged with carrying out local state law (fuero 
comun). 
c. Federal District 
Mexico’s Federal District encompasses Mexico City’s greater 
metropolitan area that includes roughly 18.7 million inhabitants and is governed by a 
directly elected head of government (colloquially known as the Mayor of Mexico City), 
                                                          
47 Reames, Benjamin Nelson. “A Profile of Police Forces in Mexico” in Cornelius and Shirk’s 
Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico.  University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, 2007, 
121. 
48 Reames, “A Profile of Police Forces,” 121. 
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who appoints the public security secretary and the attorney general of the federal district 
who are in charge of the districts’ law enforcement efforts.  The federal district consists 
of around 34,000 regular officers, 40,000 auxiliary police, and 15,000 bank police 
divided between geographic and functional responsibilities.49   
d. Federal Level 
At the federal level, responsibility for national security is split between the 
president and eight cabinet-level departments (see figure 1).  These departments have 
mandates to investigate and prosecute federal crimes, specifically organized crime, 
human trafficking, kidnapping, and drug trafficking.  The division of labor among these 
organizations is often overlapping and duplicative due to ambiguously defined authorities 
and responsibilities.  For example, not less than four different cabinet departments (the 
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and the 
Secretary of Public Security) carry out drug interdiction activities,50 and the 
investigations of drug trafficking are usually conducted by the Federal Investigations 
Agency (Agencia Federal de Investigación, AFI), and on rare occasions, the Secretary of 
National Defense (Secretaris de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA).51  Within these eight 
departments, five are tasked specifically with carrying out the nation’s anti-narcotics and 
anti-organized crime policies, the Secretary of the Navy, SEDENA, the Ministry of 
Public Security (Secretaria de Seguridad Publica, SSP), the Office of the Attorney 
General (Procurador General de la Republica, PGR), and the Interior Ministry 
(Secretaria de Governacion).  For the purposes of this thesis, these five departments will 
be divided between civilian and military entities for research and analysis, beginning with 
a review of the civilian departments and agencies relevant to combating the drug 
trafficking organizations. 
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C. CIVILIAN FEDERAL AGENCIES 
Cabinet level officials head the three primary civilian agencies, the Office of the 
Attorney General (PGR), the Ministry of Public Security (SSP), and the Interior Ministry.  
Officials appointed by the president lead each of these organizations. However, the 
national congress must approve the attorney general.  Each of these offices is (or, as is the 
case with the PGR, “was”)52 responsible for agencies charged with of much of Mexico’s 
federal law enforcement efforts.  In order to understanding the effectiveness of the 
Mexican federal efforts, a description of the major agencies is in order. This description 
will begin with changes in the Office of the Attorney General then move to the Ministry 
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Figure 1.   Mexico’s National Security Structure. 
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1. Office of the Attorney General (PGR)  
The Office of the Attorney General (PGR) has a mandate to investigate and 
prosecute federal crimes such as drug and arms trafficking, kidnapping, public health, 
and environmental crimes.  To perform these duties, President Fox disbanded the 
notoriously corrupt Federal Judicial Police and replaced it with the Federal Investigations 
Agency (AFI), similar in construct and mandate to the U.S. FBI.53  The AFI has since 
been reassigned and merged with the PFP under the Ministry of Public Security, yet the 
volume of work it has done since 2000 has been under the auspices of the PGR and so it 
is addressed here.  The PGR’s annual budget is around five billion pesos to fund their 
force of over 6,000 officers, with approximately two-thirds of the force judicial police 
and the other third split between about 1,600 investigators and 450 specialists. 
a. The Federal Investigations Agency (AFI)  
In 2001, early in his term as president, Vicente Fox disbanded the Federal 
Judicial Police force and replaced it with the Federal Investigations Agency in an attempt 
to address corruption within the agency. The move was intended to create a more 
professional and effective investigative agency with clear command structures and 
missions, better internal control mechanisms, and compartmentalized intelligence and 
operations sections.54  The results of the restructuring were not quite what the 
administration anticipated when many of the officers working in the Federal Judicial 
Police were incorporated into the newly minted AFI and with those officers came some 
of the corrupt legacies of the AFI’s predecessor.55 
There are four other agencies that currently fall under the auspices of the 
attorney general: the Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP), the Special Anti-Organized 
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Crime Unit (UEDO), Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Special Investigations 
and Organized Crime (Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia 
Organizadad, SIEDO), Office of the Deputy Attorney for Special Investigation of Federal 
Crimes (SIEDF), and the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health, 
(Fiscalía Especializada en Atención de Delitos contra la Salud, FEADS). 
b. Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP)  
Subordinate to the PGR is the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is 
charged with investigating and prosecuting crime throughout Mexico.  This dual 
responsibility is attributed to be one major source of impunity within the Mexican system 
as the same officers charged with investigating crimes are also charged with bringing 
them to court for prosecution.  This situation creates massive backlogs within the 
criminal justice system due to overload.  As an example, out of every one hundred crimes 
that are committed only twenty-five are reported (most Mexicans believe reporting crime 
to be a waste of time)56 and out of those twenty-five, only 1.6 are prosecuted and of those 
1.6, only 1.06 are sentenced, most of which are sentenced to fewer than three years.57  
This backlog has tremendous implications in the federal government’s ability to 
investigate serious crimes.  Needing to balance investigations with prosecutions divides 
time and skills between the two responsibilities as well as a requirement for very different 
skills.  The OPP will be discussed in more detail below as it has implications within the 
size and composition of the security forces. 
c. Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health 
(FEADS)  
FEADS grew out of the National Anti-Drugs Institute (Instituto Nacional 
de Combate a las Drogas, INDC) following the arrest of the head of the INDC, General 
Gutiérrez Rebollo, on charges of collaboration with the Juarez Cartel.  The restructuring 
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of INDC to FEADS, however, did not overcome the issue of corruption and ultimately, 
FEADS was also disbanded in 2003 after it was discovered that its agents were extorting 
drug traffickers. 
d. Special Anti-Organized Crime Unit (UEDO)  
In 1994, Mexico first defined organized crime in the legal code, as a 
result, the office of the PGR created the Special Anti-Organized Crime Unit (Unidad 
Especial contra la Delicuencia Organizada).  This definition in Mexico’s legal code was 
followed in 1996 by the passage of the Federal Law against Organized Crime (Ley 
Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizada – LFCDO) with the intent of dealing with 
problems such as drug, migrant, and arms trafficking.58 
e. Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Special 
Investigations and Organized Crime (SIEDO) 
SIEDO is charged with investigating crimes against public health, the 
trafficking of arms, minors, organs, and undocumented people, terrorism, counterfeiting, 
kidnappings, auto theft, and robbery.  SIEDO’s budget for 2004 was 357 million pesos.  
f. Office of the Deputy Attorney for Special Investigation of 
Federal Crimes (SIEDF) 
SIEDF prosecutes the obstruction of justice by public officials, intellectual 
property and financial crimes, and environmental damage.  SIEDF operated on a budget 
of 15.9 million pesos in 2004. 
1. Ministry of Public Safety  
The Ministry of Public Safety, headed by the Secretary of Public Safety, controls 
two agencies with responsibilities in the war on drugs and organized crime, the PFP and 
the National Public Security System (SNSP) and has just recently inherited responsibility 
for the AFI.  Although the merger of the AFI and PFP occurred in the summer of 2008, 
the agencies have retained their respective uniforms and identities.  The two agencies 
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have traditionally held different law enforcement roles, the AFI has had an investigative 
role, whereas the PFP has had held a public safety mandate.  Following the merger, 
hundreds of PFP officers were called up to the office of the Attorney General to remove 
more than one hundred AFI officers protesting the move.59 
g. Federal Preventative Police (PFP) 
The PFP was created out of legislature proposed by the Mexican Senate in 
response to public safety concerns.  The Senate legislature called for combining the 
federal highway police, the federal fiscal police, and the federal immigration police.60  In 
2000, the PFP had 10,699 officers, with 4,899 of those officers coming from the active 
duty military, around 4000 were from the Federal Highway Police, 1,500 from the Fiscal 
Police and 600 from the National Information and Security Center (CISEN) under the 
Interior Minister.61  While the military presence within the civilian law enforcement 
agency has its detractors, it has also had influences upon how the agency has been 
restructured, reorganizing the PFP into regions and functions with coordination 
departments to oversee and plan operations.  The PFP is further divided into the 
Department of Intelligence for Crime Prevention, the Department for Regional Security, 
and the Federal Support Forces.  
The Department of Intelligence for Crime Prevention has been styled upon 
their contemporary units within the PGR for information handling and analysis as well as 
for federal crimes such as terrorism, trafficking, and kidnapping.  The Department for 
Regional Security is divided into four sections; there are thirty-four regional commands 
and three federal divisions:  federal highways, ports and borders, and other federal zones.  
The Federal Support Forces consist of units anticipated to be used for emergency 
deployments in support of special operations and emergency response.  Considering the 
number of officers, the PFP’s 2004 budget of 3.6 billion pesos made up over half of the 
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SSP’s entire budget for the year.  Yet, the incorporation of the military, its subsequent 
restructuring and the vast budget, the PFP was merged with the AFI in 2008 in an attempt 
by President Calderon to consolidate the federal law enforcement agencies into one 
centralized organization to increase their effectiveness, efficiency, and to prevent 
corruption.62  The presumption here is that by merging the AFI and the PFP, they will 
eliminate confusion over jurisdiction and mandates by clarifying the roles of their parent 
departments, the PGR and the SSP. 
h. National Public Security System (SNSP)  
In an effort to elevate public security to national policy and coordinate the 
efforts of the myriad security agencies (for instance, in order to collect information and 
draw up operational plans), the Zedillo administration officially created the Executive 
Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SE-SNSP) in 1995, which is 
governed by the National Public Security Council (CNSP).  Mexico’s President is the 
head of the CNSP, and the council includes the Secretaries of the Interior, Public 
Security, the Attorney General, National Defense, Navy, the governors of each of 
Mexico’s thirty-one states, the head of the Federal District, and an SNSP executive.  
Coordinating councils at the state and local levels were also created in an effort by the 
federal government to highlight their efforts were toward planning and coordination as 
opposed to controlling the state and local efforts. 
2. Interior Ministry 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior’s principle role in domestic law enforcement 
resides within the intelligence field.  The National Information and Security Center 
(CISEN) was created in 1989 and is Mexico’s primary civilian intelligence agency.  
Modeled on the CIA and Israel’s Mossad, the CISEN performs intelligence operations 
ranging from signals intelligence (SIGINT) to include communications intelligence 
(COMINT) as well as human intelligence (HUMINT).63  However, unlike the restrictions 
                                                          
62 Schaefer et al., Security in Mexico, 17. 
63 Christophe Leroy.  Mexican Intelligence at a Crossroad.  SAIS Review, XXIV no 1 (Winter-Spring, 
2004), 109. 
 33
put on domestic spying within the United States, CISEN focuses on domestic national 
security concerns, with agents in a variety of groups, organizations and social movements 
throughout Mexico.64  Interestingly, drug traffickers’ ability to penetrate Mexico’s 
security institutions resulted in the anti-drug arm of CISEN being transferred to the 
National Drug Control Center (CENDRO), a component of INCD in 1992 then to 
FEADS when INCD was disbanded. 
D. MEXICO’S MILITARY STRUCTURE 
As depicted in Figure 1, the Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of 
the Navy each occupy cabinet level positions, without a single point of formal contact.  
The army and navy are distributed throughout Mexico by region, with the national 
headquarters in Mexico City.  This regional distribution allows non-commissioned 
members of the armed forces to remain close to family while serving in the military; 
however, officers are not afforded the same considerations.  Officers are made more 
mobile throughout the country to prevent them from establishing long lasting connections 
in any one area and possibly becoming too powerful.65 
Mexico’s army is commanded by the Secretary of National Defense and is a very 
centralized organization.  Mexico is divided by the military in to twelve separate regions; 
the applicable regions for the purposes of this thesis are located in Mexicali, Baja 
California and Torreon, Coahuila.  Each of these regions is further divided into 
subordinate Military Zones that can be tailored to meet operational requirements. 
The Navy, on the other hand, utilized the “Junta of Admirals” in an advisory 
capacity.  The members of this council place a high priority on the seniority of the 
individuals serving on the council and this priority reflects these admirals’ military 
history all the way back to their days at the naval academy.  The navy is divided 
geographically between the Gulf Force and the Pacific Force, each with its own 
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headquarters and attendant naval forces.  These forces typically consist of a destroyer 
group, a Marine Infantry Group, and a Special Forces group.   
All told, Mexico has around 277,000 troops serving in the armed forces with over 
200,000 serving in the army, about 56,000 in the navy, and roughly 11,000 serving in the 
air force.66  Since taking office in 2006, President Calderon has continued to escalate the 
number of troops involved in his war against organized crime and currently has over 
45,000 troops deployed in support of operations throughout Mexico. 
1. Mexico’s Military Involvement 
Beginning in 1977, with Plan Condor,67 Mexico has been using its military to 
combat the war on drugs and accelerating through the Salinas administration in the 
1980s, every subsequent Mexican President has deployed the military in an attempt to 
calm violence and combat drug trafficking organizations.  Yet since Calderon’s election 
in 2006, the military deployments have increased dramatically and military leaders have 
been used in a wide range of capacities that they had previously not been utilized.  As 
examples, we can point to the appointments of senior members of the military to 
traditionally civilian roles such as President Fox’s appointment of Rafael Macedo de la 
Concha as Attorney General or the Tijuana Mayor Jorge Ramos’ appointment of an army 
colonel as the head of Tijuana’s municipal police force (detailed below), as well as the 
use of military personnel as “force multipliers” to support municipal, state, and federal 
agencies frequently outgunned or ambushed by the DTOs.  
The appointment of Macedo as Attorney General in 2000 meant an increased 
interoperability between the civilian agencies (AFI) with the armed forces, giving the 
AFI the military might and a significantly less corrupted force to employ to attack 
organized crime.  Using a less corrupt entity to conduct operations against the DTOs 
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equates to a lower probability that a member of the Mexican security forces would 
compromise the operations.  However, Macedo’s appointment as Attorney General while 
increasing the effectiveness of the AFI and the military against the DTOs, does not lead 
to greater efficacy against one cartel vis-à-vis another. 
2. SEDENA’s Efforts at Reform 
While the civilian sector has undergone regular reforms, the Ministry of National 
Defense also recognized some significant challenges that Mexico' armed forces have 
faced.  For example, from 2000-2006, SEDENA lost over 120,000 soldiers to defections, 
many of which joined the ranks of organized crime.  This problem was temporarily 
exasperated following Calderon’s election when defections rose to over 1,000 a month.68 
SEDENA announced a strategy for reforming its doctrine in its 2007-2012 
Sectorial Programme that hopes to accomplish a number of goals including:69 
 Making its human resources a greater priority by increasing the standard 
of living for its service members while simultaneously increasing pay and 
benefits in order to reduce defections. 
 Increasing training and the budget for fuel and maintenance. 
 Reorganizing the army’s units as well as its deployments while 
decentralizing the air force to better balance its current operational 
requirements with the resources available.   
 Shifting Mexico’s internal security policy from insurgencies and guerrilla 
movements to drug production and organized crime, clarifying 
SEDENA’s mission in Mexico.70 
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 Performing social development actions to the benefit of the country and 
the populace.  While promoting transparency and accountability within the 
realm of civil-military relations, this has been accompanied by the creation 
of a human rights office within SEDENA’s high command. 
E. CORRUPTION 
In Mexico, corruption pervades much of Mexico’s political system. Mexico’s 
history of patronage and corruption begins even before the Mexican Revolution; although 
immediately following the revolution corruption was not only allowed to continue but the 
government itself fostered the practice.  Porfirio Diaz’s (President from 1876–80 and 
again from 1884–1911) policy of “pan o palo” (bread or stick) was the precursor for 
today’s “plata o plumo” (silver or lead), the use of patronage and/or coercion to forward 
his policies.  If Porfirio’s constituencies did not accept the charitable consolations he 
provided, they were often arrested, beaten, and occasionally murdered.  Mexico’s 
pervasive corruption has certainly not been limited to the Porfiriato period of the late 
1800s, in fact the brother of Carlos Salinas (President from December 1988 to November 
1994) was implicated in corrupt dealings with organized crime.71  Former governor of 
Quintana Roo, Mario Ernesto Villanueva Madrid was arrested in 2001 for accepting 
bribes from members of the CFO for the safe passage of narcotics through his state is yet 
another example of the legacy of corruption in Mexico. 
The violence and corruption produced by the spectrum of illicit trade in Mexico 
has permitted criminal organizations to penetrate all aspects of the legal apparatuses and 
undercut the rule of law.  The ability to destabilize these elements is essential to criminal 
organizations in order for them to flourish and avoid accountability for their actions, but 
their success in doing so is harmful to the government’s ability to further rule of law and 
human rights and further undermines the credibility of the government.  As Laurie 
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Freeman of Washington Office on Latin America succinctly puts it, “corruption can exist 
without organized crime, but organized crime cannot survive without corruption.”72 
If successful integration of criminals into the local, regional, and national 
government with a complete disregard for rule of law is perhaps the worst-case scenario 
for state control of its territory, and localized criminal activity is most likely the best-case 
scenario, where does Mexico fit into this spectrum? According to Transparency 
International, Mexico experienced a significant drop in its perceived corruption rating 
and has fallen to 89th place among nations of the world.73  This trend is also reflected in 
the many ways officials are implicated in not only corruption but in complicity in the 
drug trade.  There have also been numerous occasions where municipal police have 
violently challenged the military units and federal police that have been deployed to 
stabilize the violence and combat the DTOs.  Juarez and Tijuana have both witnessed 
significant efforts by the federal government to fight the corruption and participation in 
the drug trade by government officials at any level as detailed below.  The pervasiveness 
of corruption in Mexico provides opportunities for both cartels to minimize and mitigate 
the security systems that work to govern the cartels’ territories.   
1. Corruption in Juarez 
According to the Dallas Observer, the Juarez Cartel spends on the order of half a 
billion dollars annually on bribes to law enforcement and local officials.74  This number is 
remarkably high.  El Chapo Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel has also reportedly 
bragged that he pays over $5 million a month on bribes to law enforcement.  Over the 
course of a year it that is still $60 million, no small sum to be sure.  Regardless of the 
amount, it is safe to say the CFO pays a significant amount in order to get their product 
across the border into the United States.   
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To give an indication as to the level of corruption in the local government, in 
March of 2009, the Mexican federal government ordered over 5000 troops and federal 
police to Ciudad Juarez to bolster the nearly 2500 soldiers and police already deployed to 
Juarez.  The troops had already taken over basic patrolling efforts from the local police 
after Police Chief Robert Orduna had replaced half of Juarez’s 1600-member police 
force.75 
2. Corruption in Tijuana 
Tijuana is not without its corruption as well.  Despite past purges, the Tijuana 
police force is still viewed by many to be complicit and even cooperative in the drug 
trade, much as the police in Juarez.  The Tijuana police witnessed a major purge in 2008, 
the purge consisted of one hundred officers and later, and 500 officers were replaced by 
members of the army so they could be sent to a police academy and receive background 
checks.76  The military and federal agencies have been deployed to provide security for 
Tijuana and Juarez while the local police forces undergo the various reform measures 
(background checks and professional training). 
3. Reform Measures 
With Mexican security reform has come a number of initiatives to identify 
officers at every level of law enforcement already corrupted, and to vet new recruits to 
replace those officers found to be cooperating in some way with organized crime 
elements.  One other initiative has been pay increases for those agents and officers most 
susceptible to corruption. However, the salary and benefits still cannot compete with the 
salaries offered by the cartels.  As mentioned earlier, even in Tijuana, where salaries for 
police are the highest in the country, an officer only makes around 1200 pesos a month.  
Whereas there is a rough pay scale offered by the cartels whereby informants (at the low 
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end) make between 2,000-5,000 pesos a week, a recruiter makes between 3,000-6,000 
pesos a week, and hit men (sicarios) make about 10,000 pesos weekly.77   
The military is not immune from the cartels recruitment efforts; in fact, they are 
actually the focus of much of the cartels’ recruitment efforts, offering benefits in much 
the same manner as any well-established employer.  In a “narco-banner” hung from a 
bridge in the state of Tamaulipas, the Gulf Cartel stated that they “offer salaries in 
dollars, loans, life insurance, money to send your children to school, and housing for your 
family.”78  
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Successive Mexican administrations have used the military and federal law 
enforcement agencies to respond to crises.  However, the historical mandates of Mexico’s 
police run counter to the intended purpose of a law enforcement agency.  Instead of 
ensuring the safety of the Mexican people, for nearly seventy years the police ensured the 
durability of the PRI: the party granted the autonomy and impunity to the police, and in 
return the police provided social control and delivered loyalty of the population to the 
regime. Since Vicente Fox’s election in 2000, that contract has changed.  President 
Calderon has actively sought to combat corruption throughout Mexico since 2006.  
However, the historic legacy of poor/low public opinion of the police hinders the 
progress of the reforms.  In this context, multiple deployments of law enforcement agents 
throughout Mexico may exacerbate the security situation by increasing the presence of 
what are effectively un-trusted agents of the state. 
These same agencies have also been the focus of multiple iterations of reforms in 
the hopes of reducing corruption across the spectrum of Mexico’s security system.  While 
they may yet prove critical to Mexico’s fight against organized crime and corruption, 
these changes cannot provide adequate explanation for the variation that exists between 
the arrests of significant leaders of the AFO vis-à-vis the CFO.  Law enforcement 
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reforms, to include the military, are certainly a necessary condition for Mexico to provide 
enduring, transparent security in Mexico.  Understanding the complexity of Mexico’s 
security structures helps to put the drug war into perspective, especially as the 
government’s policy continues to evolve.   
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III. CARTEL STRUCTURES AND BEHAVIORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an analysis of the structures and behaviors of the Arellano-
Felix and Carrillo-Fuentes organizations to delineate variations between the two DTOs.  
These variations provide insights that help to explain greater success the Mexican 
government has had in capturing leaders of the AFO relative to the CFO.  The chapter 
starts with brief overviews of each of the two cartels followed by a description of the 
structures of their organizations.   
Utilizing elements of three frameworks for analyzing organizations, the chapter 
finds that structural and behavioral differences between the two cartels has made it easier 
for law enforcement agencies to capture AFO leaders.  First, it draws on Michael 
Kenney’s argument that DTO structures evolve over time to maximize security for the 
organization while simultaneously providing modes of communication.79  In line with the 
expectation, this chapter finds that the two cartels are loose, decentralized networks of 
traffickers that have some vertical accountability to a semi-hierarchical leadership 
structure. 
Second, in order to explain variation between the cartels in leadership captures, 
the chapter draws on public administration theory to analyze the varied levels of 
professionalism—specifically, expertise and specialization—displayed by the AFO and 
CFO.    Specifically, the analysis focuses mainly on DTO leadership structure.  The 
AFO’s leadership structure is comprised predominately of members of the Arellano-Felix 
family and a number of close associates.  This close-knit group provides increased social 
ties between the members, which increase the risk of apprehension of those members 
should any other member of that group be arrested.  The CFO, on the other hand, appears 
to have a more professional organization that is made up of members selected based on 
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expertise and that relies on its associations with other groups (La Linea, Barrio Aztecas, 
and Los Linces) to perform specialized activities, such as security and enforcement.   
These structural and behavioral variations between the criminal organizations 
provide opportunities for exploitation by providing law enforcement agents with 
information gathered from one arrest that leads to additional arrests.  However, 
importantly, they do not adequately explain Mexico’s relative success in capturing the 
leadership of the AFO when compared to the CFO apprehensions. Chapter IV will 
analyze other factors that, combined with DTO structures, more fully explain the 
outcome of interest.  
B. CARTEL OVERVIEWS: ORGANIZATIONAL ORIGINS AND 
TRAJECTORIES 
1. Arellano Félix Organization (AFO) 
The Arellano Félix family runs the Arellano Félix Organization (AFO), or Tijuana 
Cartel.  It was believed to be the largest and most sophisticated of the Mexican DTOs 
until the 2000-02 timeframe, during which its leader Benjamin Arellano-Felix and that 
the AFO’s enforcer Ramon Arellano-Felix, were killed.  Shortly thereafter, Mexican 
Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha claimed that more than 2,000 AFO-
affiliates had been arrested.80  Additional leadership captures have allegedly led to 
infighting over control of the organization and a split within the organization, with one 
side (Teodoro “El Teo” Garcia Simental) aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel and the other 





                                                          
80  Alfredo Joyner, “El cartel de Tijuana sigue vivo,”  Milenio, June 12, 2002 in Federal Research 
Division, “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico,” 1999–2002. Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, 2003, 7.  
81  “Aligned” in the context of Mexican DTOS means a temporary security alliance with other DTOs 
for purposes of combating other DTOs for control of a plaza or corridor. 
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Tijuana cartel has been known to operate in at least fifteen states with major areas of 
influence in Tijuana, Mexicali, Tecate, and Ensenada in Baja California and in parts of 
Sinaloa.82 
2. Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO) 
The Juarez Cartel, also known as the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), 
operates largely in Ciudad Juárez and Reynosa in north central Mexico.  Throughout 
much of the 1990s, the CFO was led by Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “Lord of the 
Skies” for loading jet airplanes full of cocaine for transporting to the United States.  
Amado subsequently died in 1997 from complications while undergoing plastic surgery 
to alter his appearance.  By 2003, with Amado’s brother Vicente Carrillo Fuentes leading 
the cartel, the CFO overshadowed the both the Tijuana and the Gulf cartels as the most 
influential, powerful, and geographically extensive trafficking organization, with 
operations found throughout seventeen Mexican states.83    
C. CARTEL STRUCTURES 
With these brief histories as a foundation, we can turn now to research on 
organizations—specifically, analysis of DTOs as networks and insights from public 
administration theory—to better understand the internal functioning of the AFO and 
CFO. One important characteristic of both cartels’ organizational structures is that overall 
they operate as loose networks, in which the individual cells enjoy considerable 
protection from capture by law enforcement agencies.  This characteristic is anticipated 
by Kenney, who argues that structures of drug trafficking organizations are typically 
based primarily upon the need for security of operation (which tends limit contact 
between members) while maintaining to the degree possible methods for communication 
in order to coordinate their activities (which is best accomplished by increased contact 
between members) such as delivery times and dispute resolution.84 These organizations 
                                                          
82 Federal Research Division, “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico,” 1999–2002. 
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83 Federal Research Division, “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico,” 8.  
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therefore practice compartmentalization to prevent the loss of any particular node of the 
trade from collapsing the organization as a whole.  For example, in a hierarchical 
organization, the loss of a key leader with a monopoly on the inner-workings of that 
organization may lead to the collapse of the organization.85  In contrast, in a loose, 
decentralized organization, each node of the organization may know members of the 
organization on each end of their particular section of the trade, but not know anything 
about the trade beyond their section.86  However, this compartmentalization comes at a 
cost: members practice security by withholding potentially incriminating information 
from one another, a practice that potentially inhibits effective operations.87  Furthermore, 
while decentralized networks provide greater security, that security comes at the price of 
an increase in the time it takes for these networks to reconstitute themselves when 
members are arrested or killed.88   
1. Professionalism as Expertise and Specialization: Insights from Public 
Administration Theory 
Although the CFO and AFO have both developed organizational structures that 
perform many of the functions listed above, those structures vary across the two cartels in 
ways not captured by Kenney’s descriptions of DTO networks.  In order to appreciate 
those characteristics and link them to the variation in leadership arrests, we can draw on 
insights from other studies of organizations, within the tradition of public administration 
theory.  Specifically, these insights help us analyze the vulnerability of cartel leadership, 
a hierarchy sitting atop each cartel’s network.  
In his 1957 book The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington presents his 
theory on the professionalization of modern military officers. Two of Huntington’s key 
dimensions of “professionalism” in his analysis of professional soldiers—as opposed to 
“amateurs”—are corporateness and expertise. Corporateness is a “sense of organic unity 
                                                          
85 Kenney.  From Pablo to Osama, 30. 
86 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 34. 
87 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 34. 
88 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 31. 
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and consciousness of a group that separates them from common laymen.”89 In terms of 
expertise, a professional is an “expert with special knowledge and skill in a significant 
field of human endeavor.”90  Huntington continues by stating this expertise is gained by 
“prolonged education and experience.”91   
We can draw on Gulick and Urwick’s element of “specialization” as it applies to 
public administrative theory in general to expand on Huntington’s point of expertise 
within professional militaries. Gulick and Urwick argue that units of an organization that 
are able to specialize in homogeneous activities increase that organization’s efficiency by 
creating expertise in those individuals engaged in the repetition of unique activities.92  
Specialization offers further efficiencies by decreasing transaction and training costs 
required for individuals regularly engaged in a wide range of disparate activities.  
DTOs that are able to professionalize specifically by increasing their expertise are 
more able to adapt and evolve to new challenges presented by law enforcement.  The 
following sections will demonstrate that the AFO and CFO present substantial variation 
in both expertise and specialization, and that this variation helps to explain differences in 
adaptation and, therefore, leadership captures across the two cases.  Specifically, the CFO 
exhibits a high level of expertise and specialization, due in part to its practice of 
contracting its work out to outside organizations.  These characteristics have made the 
cartel highly adaptive to changing Mexican law enforcement strategies.  In contrast, the 
AFO enjoys no such ongoing associations and is not divided into specialized units, and it 
would be inaccurate to characterize its permanent members as “experts” by Huntington’s 
standards, given that the cartel’s core leadership is composed mostly of members of the 
Arellano-Felix family.     
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2. The CFO: Professionalism Through Internal Hires and 
Subcontracting 
Consistent with Kenney’s expectations of DTO structures, the CFO is a relatively 
flat organization with insulated units that provide the leadership protection against 
captures, retaining a degree of hierarchy with as few as four levels of management from a 
wholesale trafficker to Vicente Carrillo Fuentes himself.  The case of the Juarez House of 
Death illustrates the organization’s shallow hierarchy: Guillermo Ramierez Peyro or 
“Lalo” was an informant for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Agency (ICE) while 
working initially as a trafficker and later as a witness and participant in multiple murders 
perpetrated by members of the Juarez Cartel.  While the narrative of the story and 
subsequent scandal is interesting, it is also telling in how this particular cartel is 
structured and how the roles of individuals are fluid.  During his tenure as 
informant/participant for ICE and the Juarez Cartel, Lalo claims that he was called upon 
by Heriberto “Il Ingeniero” Santillan Tabares to purchase quicklime to dissolve the body 
of a victim.93  He also claims that at the time, Il Ingeniero was only one level away from 
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes.  If indeed, that is the case then this case indicates a hierarchical 
structure that employs vertical accountability.    
The CFO also employs the use of “subcontractors” to provide necessary services 
for the drug trafficking organization.  The CFO maintains relationships with at least one 
prominent prison gang, “Barrio Aztecas,” and has been aligned with a group of (active 
and former) police officers that provide security and enforcement for the organizations 
operations.  The CFO’s close connections with La Linea, Barrio Aztecas, and Los Linces 
provide not only specialized services for the organization, but also an additional level of 
compartmentalization that further insulates the leaders of the CFO.  By using outside 
organizations to conduct large portions of illicit activity, the CFO affords itself an 
additional degree of separation from those activities.  The use of these organizations for 
specialized, homogenous activities allows these organizations to gain expertise in their 
 
                                                          
93 Rose, David.  “The House of Death.”  The Observer, 3 December 2006. Retrieved from  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/03/usa.davidrose on December 14, 2009. 
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respective fields.  It also frees the CFO from having to divert manpower and resources 
toward those activities and allows the CFO to focus on those activities most pertinent to 
their core competencies.   
The employment of outside organizations that are able to specialize in security 
and enforcement operations is a relatively recent development in the Mexican drug trade 
that likely began with Los Zetas in the late 1990s.94  This development of specialized 
units marks an evolution in the structure of these organizations, indicating a higher level 
of professionalism that facilitates more efficient operations while providing greater 
security for the leadership elements of the cartels.  Generally, these organizations may 
have members or cells of members that have specific skills that are used by the group to 
increase the organization’s effectiveness.  These members or cells of members may be 
trained or used for intelligence collection, infiltration tactics, military equipment, or 
communication systems.  Several drug cartels use the cells in much the same way they 
are utilized by the military, bringing a level of specialization and synergy to the group as 
a whole. Cartels have also been reported using specially designed uniforms, have a rank 
structure, and may teach their ideology to new members.95  
3. The AFO: Unprofessional Nepotism and Multitasking 
A look at the AFO’s money laundering operations indicates a network very 
similar to the semi-hierarchical structure described in the Lalo case, and yet poor 
expertise and a lack of specialization distinguish the AFO from the CFO.  Illustrative of 
the AFO’s hierarchy, the Lorenzo Arce Flores money-laundering cell has a single 
individual (Lorenzo Arce Flores) in contact with members of the AFO.  This relationship 
                                                          
94 Los Zetas were a group of Mexican army Special Forces soldiers that defected from the army only 
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between the AFO and Arce is a verbal contract for money laundering services.96  This 
single point of contact to the leaders provides some insulation from the leaders of the 
AFO by limiting that particular interaction to a single individual; both the AFO and Arce 
minimize the number of people aware of their operations.  From Arce, there are two 
subordinate individuals who have connections with a network of businesses and 
associates that perform the laundering services for the cartel indicating an overall 
management system remarkably similar to that of the Lalo case.97  
Despite the similarity in the overall shape of the CFO and AFO cartels—i.e., a 
shallow hierarchy above a loose network—the cartel leaderships differ in terms of 
expertise and specialization.  The AFO does not employ outside organizations to the 
same degree as the CFO. Rather, permanent members appear to perform all of the 
organization’s tasks.  The AFO’s lack of affiliation with outside organizations indicates 
that the level to which the AFO engages in specialization is maintained within the parent 
organization itself.  However, in contrast to the CFO leadership, the leadership of the 
AFO is comprised nearly entirely of family members of the Arellano-Felix family.  This 
indicates an inclination to promote family relations over individuals that may have more 
experience at performing the necessary functions of a cartel (e.g. contract enforcement, 
distribution, trainer, investor) and therefore be more qualified to lead the organization.  
Those individuals that are not members of the Arellano-Felix that make up the rest of the 
AFO leadership are closely connected to the eleven members of the Arellano-Felix 
family.  The fact that the key members of the Arellano-Felix cartel are all blood relatives 
increases the number of very close ties these members have to one another.  This means 
that the leaders of the AFO not members of the Arellano-Felix family with even a single 
link to any one member of the family automatically have only two degrees of separation 
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between themselves and any member of the Arellano-Felix family.  Therefore, the 
capture of any single member of the Arellano-Felix family or those leaders on the 
periphery of the family can result in the transfer of vast amounts of information about the 
leadership operations of the AFO to law enforcement agents.  The 1997 arrest of 
Everardo Arturo Paez-Martinez indicates just how much information can be gained from 
the apprehension of a single member of the AFO’s leadership.   
Paez’s arrest and subsequent extradition to the United States provided tremendous 
insights into the operations and participant’s roles in the organization’s operations.  
Information provided by Paez indicated Benjamin Arellano’s authorization of the killing 
of a Mexican prosecutor as well as his brother Eduardo’s role as Benjamin’s key advisor.  
Paez’s testimony also indicated Ramon Arellano as the cartel’s chief enforcer whose 
brutality greatly reduced any outside attempts at contesting the AFO’s control of the 
Tijuana plaza.  The testimony of this one member of the cartel not only provided 
information on the roles these individual’s played in the organization’s operations but 
also provided specific case information in the cartel’s attempts to thwart any law 
enforcement prosecution for the accidental murder of a prominent Mexican cardinal. 
AFO enforcers killed Cardinal Posadas Ocampo by accident in a bungled attempt 
to kill rival cartel leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.  The AFO immediately tried to 
control the damage by giving the chief of the Federal Judicial Police, Rodolfo Leon 
Aragona, a $10 million bribe.  The bribe was an effort to get the head of the agency to 
“do what he could” to protect the AFO from the subsequent investigations.98  
Interestingly, the AFO leadership has failed to adapt to the DEA and Mexican 
government’s systematic targeting of the leaders of the organization.  The AFO’s failure 
to adapt and insistence on promoting from within the family is indicative of an 
organization that places preference on familial relations over competence.  This practice 
is indicative of an organization that is less pragmatic in its approach to leadership and 
alludes to less professional leadership behaviors.  Being a member of the Arellano-Felix 
family equates to being drug trafficking royalty in Mexico and membership has its 
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privileges and drawbacks.  The privilege lies in the access to quick wealth and relative 
power within the organization.  The drawbacks, equally powerful, reside in the fact that 
as a participant at the higher echelons of the Mexican drug trade, these individuals are 
subject to a lifetime of pursuit by law enforcement agents on either side of the border.   
D. CONCLUSIONS 
These two major cartels seem to have very similar structures: both are remarkably 
flat yet retain some level of vertical accountability as illustrated by the Lalo and Arce 
cases.  Yet upon closer examination, the similarities begin to diverge when reviewing the 
social links of the AFO leadership and the outside organizations affiliated with the CFO.  
Variations between the structures and behaviors of the AFO and CFO in terms of level of 
professionalism provide some limited basis for explaining the Mexican government’s 
relative success in capturing the leaders of the AFO when compared with the CFO.  With 
regard to one dimension of professionalism, specialization, it is apparent that the CFO 
benefits from subcontracting much of the risky services to other organizations, such as La 
Linea and Barrio Aztecas.  These relationships afford the core group of drug traffickers 
an additional degree of separation from a number of high-risk activities.  Conversely, the 
AFO lacks such affiliations and therefore must incur the costs associated with those 
activities.   
The structure of these organizations also speaks to varying levels of expertise—
another dimension of professionalism—displayed by the organizations.  By 
subcontracting high-risk activities, CFO affiliates are able to specialize and therefore gain 
expertise in those homogeneous activities, giving them a competitive advantage over 
rivals that are unable or unwilling to specialize.  This arrangement also affords the CFO 
the opportunity to specialize in those activities most relevant to the organization’s 
primary mission.  In contrast, the AFO has a nepotistic leadership structure, which creates 
a large number of social ties between its members.  By promoting from within the 
Arellano-Felix family, the organization preferences less-professional family connections 
over individuals that may have more experience and competence.  This leadership 
structure also facilitates law enforcement’s efforts to apprehend the leaders of this 
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organization through the exploitation of these close social ties.  The example of the 1997 
arrest of Everardo Arturo Paez-Martinez provides evidence of the potential downfall of a 
single member of the AFO’s leadership.  Through Paez’s arrest, law enforcement 
agencies gained critical insights to the AFO’s leadership operations.  Importantly, there 
are limits to the degree to which we can apply the concept of “professionalism” to drug 
cartels. For instance, while DTOs can professionalize in their expertise and 
corporateness, the financially driven drug trade runs counter to Huntington’s assertion 
that professionals cannot be primarily motivated by money.99  
This chapter has argued that the AFO and CFO’s networks, relations, and 
interactions help to explain why the Mexican government has been so successful in 
systematic dismantling the AFO leadership.  However, these variables do not provide a 
compete explanation for the disparity.  The structures of the leadership regimes in the 
AFO lend themselves to greater exploitation by law enforcement, yet an examination of 
the history of the DEA provides some very significant influences in the outcomes 
witnessed between the AFO and CFO, the focus of the next chapter. 
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IV. THE PATH-DEPENDENT NATURE OF U.S. DRUG POLICY 
IN MEXICO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The prior chapter argued that certain characteristics of the AFO and CFO 
organizations—namely their degree of structural differentiation and professionalism—
help to explain Mexican government agencies’ varied success in capturing cartel leaders 
of these two groups.  This chapter presents an additional, overlapping factor.  Research 
conducted for this thesis finds that the United States’ involvement in investigating DTOs 
in Mexico has played a significant part in explaining the Mexican government’s success 
in capturing leaders of two organizations.  This chapter begins with an analysis of the 
arrests of individual leaders of both cartels to illustrate the great extent to which the DEA 
has been involved in AFO leadership arrests relative to the (few) arrests of CFO leaders. 
It then turns to a review of U.S.-Mexico relations as they apply to the prosecution of the 
drug war.  The chapter then focuses its attention on a defining moment in the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) history and subsequent investigation, in order to 
explain how an event that occurred in 1985 shaped U.S. anti-drug operations, and in turn, 
Mexican law enforcement agency success over the next twenty-five years.  The analysis 
subsequently examines how across-time changes in U.S.-Mexico economic and political 
relations have resulted in a significant increase in arrests of AFO leaders since 2000, 
without a corresponding change in the case of the CFO.    
B. ARRESTS OF AFO AND CFO CARTEL LEADERS 
This section reviews the central outcome of interest for this research: variation 
across time and across cartel in leadership arrests. The discussion will show that there 
were a few, important arrests of leaders of the AFO’s antecedent, the Guadalajara cartel, 
starting in the late 1980s. Once the Guadalajara cartel was disbanded, Mexican law 
enforcement officials continued their successful capture of leaders in the group’s 
successor cartel, arresting many AFO leaders in the post-2000 period. In contrast, we 
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observe a trend of very few arrests of CFO leaders from the founding of the cartel in the 
1970s, through its leadership transfer to Amado Carrillo Fuentes in the early 1990s, and 
up through the present.  
Two questions therefore emerge from the following description of arrests. First, 
why was there an increase in arrests starting in 2000? Second, why were those arrests of 
AFO leaders and not CFO leaders? The analysis of the arrest cases suggests the need to 
analyze U.S.-Mexico relations and U.S. interests, given that the DOJ  has assisted in 
some way in the majority of the AFO cartel arrests.  Subsequent sections therefore turn to 
considering the role of the U.S. government, especially the DEA, in Mexico’s drug war. 
1. Prosecution of the Arellano-Felix Organization 
This discussion of AFO leadership arrests focuses on the period since 2000. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the focus on the AFO is best traced back to the 
AFO’s precursor, the Guadalajara Cartel, led by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo.100 When 
Gallardo and other members of the Guadalajara Cartel leadership were captured in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, the cartel was disbanded. Gallardo’s nephews Benjamin and 
Ramon Arellano-Felix stepped in to fill the void, and their organization became known as 
the Tijuana/Arellano Felix Cartel.101 
 Against this historical backdrop of the AFO’s genesis, the most significant 
increase in arrests of the AFO cartel line began after 2000.  Collaborating 
with U.S. law enforcement agencies from 2000 through April 2010, 
Mexican law enforcement agencies have had considerable success 
capturing members of the AFO.  Mexican authorities have arrested no less 
than eight individuals that figure prominently in the cartel.  Mexican 
police are also credited with the death of another during a shootout.  The 
U.S. Coast Guard was able to apprehend a tenth member while out to sea 
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in international waters.  An overview of the pertinent information is 
provided below in Table 2 with a description of the individual cases to 
follow. The analysis not only presents the high number of successful 
arrests, but it also demonstrates the great extent to which U.S. agencies 
were involved in those arrests. Units of the Mexican Army arrested the 
leader of the AFO, Benjamin Arellano-Felix, on March 9, 2002 following 
a combined investigation conducted by U.S. and Mexican authorities.102 
 Ramon Arellano-Felix was killed in a shootout with a Mexican police 
officer in February 2002 following a routine traffic violation.  The officer 
credited with killing the older Arellano-Felix was unaware of the identity 
of the man he had shot when he stopped him for the traffic violation.   
 As of December 31, 2004, a combined U.S.-Mexico investigation, code-
named Operation United Eagles,103 resulted in the arrest of nineteen 
members of the AFO.  Of the nineteen individuals arrested, five were 
included in the Department of Justices’ Consolidated Priority Organization 
Target (CPOT) “Tier 1” wanted lists.104  As a result of Operation United 
Eagles, Efrain Perez and Jorge Aureliano-Felix, were arrested on June 4 
2004.  AFO member Gilberto Higuera-Guerrero was arrested a month 
later, also as a result of the combined operation. 
 The ever-evolving and tightening of the relationships between U.S. and 
Mexican authorities lead directly to the arrest of Eduardo Arellano-Felix.  
Responding to information provided by the DEA, Mexican authorities 
arrested Arellano-Felix on October 27, 2008. 
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 According to a PGR press report, Rigobeto Yanez Guerrero was arrested 
in March 2001 and subsequently entered a witness protection program in 
Mexico.105  Yanez remains on DEA international fugitives list, pending 
extradition. 
 Secretary of Public Security (SSP) agents arrested U.S. citizen Gustavo 
Rivera-Martinez on March 12, 2008, in the Mexican state of Baja Sur.  
Rivera-Martinez was arrested following an investigation conducted by 
Mexican federal police in conjunction with their DEA counterparts. 
 Mexican Federal Police arrested Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental on 
January 12, 2010, following a five-month investigation conducted in 
conjunction with the DEA.  Garcia was a former leader in the AFO that 
had split with the AFO to run an independent operation.  The two cartels 
fought for the plaza in Tijuana from 2006 until late 2008 and while Garcia 
was no longer working for the AFO, he seems to be the exception that 
proves the rule.  Regardless of the current status of his affiliation with the 
AFO, the DEA and Mexican authorities maintained a focus on Garcia’s 
influences in Tijuana. 
 The tenth high-ranking member of the AFO arrested since 2000 was also a 
member of the Arellano-Felix family.  The U.S. Coast Guard arrested 
Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix in August 2006 following information 
provided by the DEA.   
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Table 1.   AFO Leadership Arrests.  Information for this table provided by multiple 
sources106 
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2. Prosecution of the Carrillo-Fuentes Organization 
Since 2000, Mexican officials have arrested a number of individuals in 
collaboration with the Carrillo-Fuentes Organization, but fewer than in the case of the 
AFO.  The most notable arrest has been the nephew of Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes (the 
leader of the cartel).  U.S. authorities in El Paso arrested one other member of the cartel.  
Figure 2 provides an overview of the major arrests against the CFO and the details of 
each apprehension are further discussed below. In contrast to the AFO arrests, we 
observe relatively little U.S. involvement in the CFO cases.  The three cases listed below 
are significant members of the CFO.   
 Agents of the Ministry of Public Security (Secretaria de Seguridad 
Publica, SSP) arrested Vicente Carrillo-Leyva in 2009.  Carrillo-Leyva 
had been using an alias.  However, the SSP agents were able to track him 
down through his wife because she had not changed her identity. 
 Mexican federal agents arrested Alcides Ramón Magaña in July 2001 
following a long investigation by Mexican authorities.  Officials from the 
DEA commented on Magana’s position in the cartel and his illicit 
activities, yet no mention was made of U.S. involvement in his arrest. 
 Agents from SIEDO arrested Pedro Sanchez Arras on 13 May 2008 along 
with six gunmen.  The group was found to be in possession of numerous 
military and police uniforms.  At the time of his arrest, multiple media 
reports site Sanchez as one of the highest-ranking members of the CFO, 
yet no mention is made of his arrest on by the Department of Justice.107 
                                                          




Table 2.   CFO Leadership Arrests.  Information for this table was provided  
by multiple sources108 
This analysis of cartel leader arrests points to an important increase in AFO 
arrests since 2000, in contrast to very few in the case of the CFO. The task at hand 
therefore remains to explain both across-time and across-cartel variation. Because the 
discussion demonstrates a high level of U.S. involvement in AFO arrests, a logical place 
to look for answers is in U.S. involvement in Mexico’s drug war. 
C. U.S.–MEXICO RELATIONS 
Understanding changes in U.S.-Mexico relations, particularly since the debt crisis 
in the early 1980s, is critical to understanding how U.S. participation in Mexico’s 
counterdrug efforts ultimately helps to explain arrests of AFO and CFO cartel leaders.  
This section analyzes how improved U.S.-Mexico relations in the years after the debt 
crisis facilitated increased U.S. influence on the Mexican government’s counterdrug 
efforts. More specifically, it argues that Mexico’s increased efforts to arrest cartel leaders 
have been the result of three important events: the U.S. certification program; the 
negotiations for NAFTA; and the election of President Fox. With improved relations, the 
U.S. was better able to channel resources—including intelligence and investigative 
assistance—to the Mexican government and its law enforcement agencies. A subsequent 
                                                          
108 Chris Kraul. “Mexico arrests accused drug cartel leader,” Los Angeles Times, June 14, 2001; DEA 
News Release, June 27, 2001; Associated Press, June 21, 2001; Alfredo Corchado. “Border official 
demoted during inquiry,” The Dallas Morning News, January 4, 2006; Ken Ellingwood. “Suspected No. 2 
figure in Juarez drug cartel arrested the son of a dead kingpin had been on a list of the most wanted.” Los 
Angeles Times, April 3, 2009. 
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section will analyze the source of the DEA on the AFO, as opposed to the CFO: the 1985 
killing of a DEA agent in Tijuana.     
It is important to remember that these improved international relations between 
the two countries occurred in parallel along with another dynamic that may have 
increased Mexican capacity to capture cartel leaders, and therefore that may help to 
explain across-time variation in cartel captures: ongoing efforts within the Mexican 
government since the 1990s to increase effectiveness of its agencies (see Chapter II) and 
significant efforts since the 2000s to reduce corruption.  
As background for the analysis of U.S.-Mexico relations since the 1980s, an 
inauspicious U.S.-Mexican history has influenced Mexican foreign policy.  Mexico’s 
government has maintained a preference for non-intervention in international affairs, in 
large part due to the various military escapades of the United States.  The loss of one-
third of Mexico in the U.S.-Mexico War (1846), General Pershing’s unsuccessful foray 
into Mexico after Pancho Villa (1916), and the Marine Corps’ landing at Vera Cruz in 
1915 are stark reminders of U.S. meddling in Mexican sovereign lands.  This history has 
also influenced how Mexican officials may perceive U.S. pressures to further their own 
agendas.109   
Mexico’s government has held its sovereignty sacrosanct ever since the U.S.-
Mexican War in 1846.  This position has been reinforced by the multiple incursions by 
U.S. military forces.  As the following discussion will show with regard to U.S.-Mexico 
relations in the drug policy arena, Mexican officials have disdained the American 
certification process (in place from 1986 until 2002) that directly tied U.S. foreign 
assistance funding to recipient nations’ participation in international counternarcotics and 
human rights programs.110  The U.S. bureaucratic infighting over human rights violations 
has resulted in the withholding of most of the $1.1 billion Merida Initiative funding that 
was proposed  in 2006 as a three-year program.  Since its inception, three years after the 
                                                          
109 Hesitation and second thoughts on the part of Mexican officials’ may be warranted given the 
United States’ proclivity to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries (Chile, 1973; Cuba, 1961; 
Granada, 1983; Panama, 1989 to name a few contemporary examples). 
110 “Mexico grumbles about perceived U.S. interference in its internal affairs,” SourceMex Economic 
News & Analysis on Mexico. March 9, 2005 
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program began, Mexico has received just $161 million.  Most of the infighting is over a 
significant rise in human rights violations in the last three years and is the most recent 
occurrence of U.S. domestic politics altering in some way the U.S. end of an international 
agreement.  Although the funding was eventually released, the event is illustrative of the 
complex and intertwined nature of United States aid programs and how events within one 
branch of the U.S. government can affect the intentions of another.  U.S.-Mexico 
relations have improved over the last two decades, predominately due to economic 
incentives but additionally as a result of the changing political environment in Mexico 
resulting from the election of the first political party other than the PRI in nearly seventy 
years.  This improvement in foreign relations has afforded new opportunities for 
increased security cooperation between the two nations.  
1. Economic Impetus for Integration 
U.S.-Mexico relations on the drug war front began to improve only after Mexico 
succumbed to an unsustainable financial crisis in 1982, when out of desperation to 
achieve economic stability through increased economic integration with its northern 
neighbor, Mexico’s government gave in to U.S. pressures to pursue aggressively drug 
trafficking organizations.   
Improved U.S.-Mexico relations, and therefore U.S. influence on Mexican 
security policy can be traced to Latin America’s debt crisis on the 1980s.  Mexico’s 
inability to service massive loans in the early 1980s had reached an unsustainable level in 
1982 when Mexico declared it would be unable to meet its debt obligations.  Mexico was 
merely first in a line of countries that were to experience disastrous financial straits in 
1980s.  The financial crisis of 1982 resulted in a shift in Mexico’s economic future 
towards greater integration with its regional neighbors, including the United States.  
Greater integration began in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
which tied Mexico’s ascension to the free trade agreement to greater participation in the 
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drug war.111  The process of integration expanded with the fall of the PRI in 2000 and the 
presidential election of Vicente Fox (2000–06) and continues to develop through the 
efforts of President Felipe Calderon (2006-current).  However, before the dramatic shifts 
toward greater economic and security integration began, the United States utilized a 
process of certification in order to influence foreign governments to make efforts to 
comply with international counternarcotics laws.  
2. Efforts to Avoid Decertification  
In 1986, the U.S. government initiated a process of certification for countries 
assessed to be either major source or transit points for narcotics trafficking.112  The 
certification process was tied to criteria designed to evaluate a country’s efforts to combat 
drug trafficking, such as the requirement that the country’s government provide a 
counternarcotics budget, demonstrate interdiction and eradication efforts, implement 
legal reforms, and cooperate with the U.S. government. For Mexico, cooperation 
included allowing U.S. DEA agents in Mexico.  Beginning in the 1980s with the Salinas 
administration (1988-1994) and continued through the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo 
(1994-2000), Mexico made symbolic efforts to avoid decertification.113  Each year, the 
Mexican government attempted to arrest leaders of the drug cartels in order to gain the 
favor of the U.S. president.  President Fox not only continued this trend but also 
accelerated it by focusing his efforts on capturing the leaders of the cartels.114  
The case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) highlights the 
tight linkages between the Mexican government’s meeting U.S. counterdrug criteria and 
                                                          
111 The war on drugs is largely a United States derived policy as it is understood to be a policy 
priority of President Nixon’s administration.  The war on drugs was initiated and punctuated with the 
establishment of the Drug Enforcement Agency as well as entities such as the El Paso Intelligence Center 
(EPIC), which focuses on the narcotics trade along the border.    Latin American governments (until 
recently as Latin American source and transit nations have increased in their own demand for narcotics) 
generally have viewed the drug war as a “gringo problem.”  Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2000; Bruce 
Bagely.  “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1, [Fall 1988], 82. 
112 Jorge Chabat, “Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexico Relations: The Sources of Conflict”, paper 
presented at CIDE as part of the Seminar on Mexico’s Security Problematique: Domestic and International 
Dimensions, Mexico City, 25 February, 2008, 296. 
113 Chabat.  “Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexico Relations,” 2008, 297. 
114 Chabat.  “Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexico Relations,” 2008, 299. 
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economic integration between the two countries.  When President Salinas took office in 
1988, he sought to expand U.S.-Mexico economic integration with his neighbor to the 
North.  Although not formally part of the ongoing U.S.-Canada free trade negotiations at 
the time, Salinas suggested the inclusion of Mexico in the negotiations.  Salinas 
appreciated the relative importance the war on drugs had on U.S. domestic policies.  He 
went so far as to sign the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Trafficking in Illicit 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and widely expanded Mexico’s anti-drug operations to 
show the U.S. audience that Mexico was determined to do their part in the war on 
drugs.115  This understanding of the U.S. domestic political scene was not only 
recognized by both sides of the border, but was also promoted by U.S. officials as the 
primary obstacle toward the greater economic integration via NAFTA.116  
President Salinas’ interest in free trade with the United States provided the U.S. 
Justice Department with an opportunity to gain some traction in its war on drugs.  This 
increased integration with U.S. law enforcement agencies was just the opportunity the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) needed to pursue the individuals and organizations 
that were implicated in the most notorious event in the DEA’s history, discussed below.   
3. Increased Cooperation in the Drug War Since 2000 
While events in Mexico and in the United States paved the way for the smooth 
passage of NAFTA, Mexico’s increased participation in the drug war began to manifest 
itself in a number of ways through the 1990s and have accelerated dramatically since 
Fox’s election in 2000.  Some initiatives have included bilateral border task forces 
consisting of members from Mexico’s Public Ministry and federal anti-drug agents, and 
the DEA, FBI, and Customs agents in an effort to coordinate information and operations.  
The DEA has led numerous U.S.-Mexico combined operations since the mid-1990s and 
                                                          
115 Peter Andreas. “Building Bridges and Barricades” in Transnational Crime and Public Security: 
Challenges to Mexico and the United States, edited by John Bailey and Jorge Chabat, (Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 2002) 199.  
116 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Assessment.  Mexican Counterdrug Security 
Forces: Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.D.: Defense Intelligence Agency, June 1992), iv. 
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has made significant strides towards greater cooperation and coordination.  The U.S. 
military interactions with Mexico are limited to anti-narcotics operations and senior 
officer visits.117   
There have also been regional and local initiatives over the course of the last two 
decades.  The Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM) was established between the U.S. State 
Department and the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in 1992.  The BLM provided a 
legal framework for cooperation between regional transborder governments.  This 
framework established the conditions for the sharing of information between local law 
enforcement agencies on either side of the border.  “In the San Diego-Tijuana region, 
most U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies at every level—federal, state, and 
local—have liaison teams for dealing directly with their cross-border counterparts.”118  
This increased cooperation has been characterized by law enforcement agencies as an 
important mechanism in fighting crime along the border.119  
With the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, the level of security cooperation 
between the United States and Mexico has increased dramatically.  Perhaps the most 
representative of increased cooperation was Fox’s endorsement for establishing an FBI 
training school in Mexico to train its police.  And despite the fact the two governments 
signed an extradition treaty in 1978, for over two decades extraditions were sporadic at 
best and were one sided with the United States extraditing far more individuals to 
                                                          
117 The limited interaction with the Mexican military is a result of Mexican defense structures lacking 
a combatant command level counterpart to the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM.  Historically, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense is the primary point of contact with Mexican defense official.  This relationship 
exists due to NORTHCOM’s relatively recent establishment in 2002.  Previously, Mexico went unassigned 
to any particular U.S. combatant command’s area of responsibility.  John A. Cope, “A Prescription for 
Protecting the Southern Approach,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 42, 3rd quarter 2006, 19. 
118 Jose Maria Ramos, “Managing Transborder Cooperation on Public Security: The Tijuana-San 
Diego Region,” Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego, (2003) 7. 
119 Despite these advancements in cooperation between the regional governments, there are limits to 
the level of institutionalization of this cooperation because of its reliance on personal relationships between 
individuals on either side of the border.  Shirk, David and Jose Ramos,  “Binational Collaboration in Law 
Enforcement and Public Security Issues on the U.S.-Mexican Border,” paper presented at the Conference 
on reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico,” Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, May 15–
17, 2003, in Ramos, Managing Transborder Cooperation on Public Security, 7. 
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Mexico.120  In the new context of stronger bilateral relations, between 2001 and 2003, 
Mexico dramatically increased the number of extraditions to seventy-two individuals.121  
From his inauguration in 2006 until 2009, President Calderon had more than doubled the 
extradition rate of his predecessors, sending more than 200 individuals to the United 
States for prosecution.   
In this most recent period, we have observed ongoing parallels between the 
security and economic arenas. Along with the increased international cooperation on the 
security front, there have been ongoing and increasing, strong trade relations between the 
two countries. In 2008, trade with the United States accounted for $234 billion of 
Mexico’s $292 billion in exports, up from $34.6 billion since the 1994 adoption of 
NAFTA.122  In fact, trade between Mexico, the United States, and Canada has tripled 
since the introduction of NAFTA,123 while the United States’ trade with Mexico grew 
eightfold since 1986.124   
D. PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE DEA’S FOCUS ON THE AFO 
The history of the United States’ agencies charged with prosecuting the war on 
drugs has fundamentally shaped the direction of the Mexican government’s war on drugs. 
The increased security cooperation between the United States and Mexico analyzed in the 
prior section has allowed the DEA to capitalize on its determination to apprehend the 
leaders of the AFO.  This section establishes the source of that focus, the 1985 
                                                          
120 From 1980 to 2000, Mexico extradited 69 individuals to the United States, while the U.S. 
extradited 110 persons to Mexico.  Mexican Foreign Ministry, “Mexican Embassy to the United States: 
Extradition.” Retrieved from 
http://portal.sre.gob.mx/usa/index.php?option=displaypage&Itemid=107&op=page&SubMenu on April 21, 
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assassination of Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a DEA agent in Tijuana, using path 
dependence as a way to understand the DEA’s focus on the AFO since that event. It 
argues that the 1985 case served as a critical juncture that set the DEA on a path of 
persecuting the AFO rather than the CFO.  
As background for the analysis, a brief note about the U.S. DEA is in order. The 
DEA is a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ).  The DOJ is the United States’ 
executive government agency charged with enforcing “the law and defend the interests of 
the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and 
domestic.”125  To that end, the DOJ has several subordinate agencies under its command: 
the DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Drug Intelligence 
Agency (NDIC), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).  The 1985 kidnapping and 
murder of Camarena, a member of the DEA, was a death of a DOJ agent by extension.  
Therefore, subsequent pursuit of the AFO was carried out not only by the DEA, the 
United States’ lead counternarcotics agency, but also by other DOJ agencies, such as the 
FBI and USMS. 
1. The Case of Enrique Camarena 
The 1985, murder of DEA agent, Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, was a defining 
moment in the history of the war on drugs and the DEA’s part in combating it.  A review 
of the case and the U.S. and Mexican agencies’ responses to it demonstrates that the 
governments on both sides of the border devoted a high level of attention to the case. The 
discussion also reveals significant international tensions, which are understandable within 
the broader context of delicate U.S.-Mexico relations that had not yet warmed, as 
analyzed above. 
In 1985, Special Agent Camarena was working in Guadalajara to identify the 
identities of drug kingpins active in the area.  On February 7, he left his office in 
Guadalajara to meet his wife for lunch when he was abducted.  Camarena’s abduction 
was reported almost immediately and the remaining agents in Guadalajara began an 
                                                          
125 U.S. Justice Department.  Mission Statement. Retrieved from 
www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/overview.htm on May 21, 2010. 
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investigation.  Based upon information gathered from the initial queries, the DEA 
requested the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) investigate Rafael Caro-Quintero, 
Miguel Felix-Gallardo, and Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo in connection with the abduction.  
MFJP agents confronted Caro-Quintero at the Guadalajara airport.  Following a brief 
standoff between Caro-Quintero and the MFJP, Caro-Quintero was released by the MFJP 
commander and allowed to board his plane.  A farm worker later found Camarena’s body 
in a field outside Michoacán, Mexico.   
Camarena’s murder and the subsequent refusal of Mexican authorities to 
adequately (in the eyes of U.S. Department of Justice) investigate the crime resulted in 
the United States government initiating a massive border search, creating substantial 
traffic jams that slowed business along the border for both countries.  In a second 
incident, Raphael Carlo-Quintero, a drug trafficker wanted for his possible connection 
with Camarena’s murder, was waiting to board a plane to leave Guadalajara when the 
Mexican Federal Jurisdiction Police confronted him. Instead of being held for 
questioning in connection with Camarena’s death as the U.S. DOJ had requested, Carlo-
Quintero was allowed to board his plane and depart following a brief armed standoff and 
discussion with Mexican federal agents.126  Caro-Quintero was later arrested by local 
authorities with help from the DEA in Costa Rica and deported back to Mexico for 
prosecution.  
Following Camarena’s murder, the DEA focused its attentions on a number of 
members of the Guadalajara Cartel as part of the overall efforts of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, to include the FBI, Customs, and the Marshals Service.  The subsequent 
investigation was given the codename Operation Leyenda and “turned out to be the most 
comprehensive homicide investigation ever undertaken by DEA.”127  Three other 
suspects in the kidnapping implicated Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo in Camarena’s 
                                                          
126 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “1985–1990.”Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/history/1985–1990.html on April 16, 2010. 
127 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. “News Release,” March 4, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr030410.html on May 29, 2010. 
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murder.128  Gallardo, a key leader of the Guadalajara Cartel also happened to be the uncle 
of Benjamin and Ramon Arellano-Felix, the founding leaders of the AFO.129   
Operation Leyenda created a great deal of animosity on both sides of the border.  
In April of 1990, six individuals, controlled by the DEA,130 captured Dr. Humberto 
Alvarez-Machain in Mexico and delivered him to the DEA in El Paso, Texas. Dr. 
Alvarez was later convicted of participating in Camarenas’s murder.131  Mexico lodged 
three formal diplomatic protests against the illegal kidnapping.  The Los Angeles District 
Court as well as the Ninth Circuit court dismissed the charges against Alvarez-Machain 
because they argued his seizure violated the extant extradition treaty between the United 
States and Mexico.  The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the lower courts, 
arguing that the defendant’s abduction took place on foreign soil and as a slight extension 
of past precedence (Ker v Illinois and Frisbie v Collins): “abduction does not affect or 
preclude personal jurisdiction”132  Although Alvarez was subject to prosecution in the 
United States, he was later acquitted of wrongdoing in the Camarena case. 
Combined with DEA agents implicated in the abduction of Dr. Alvarez, U.S.-
Mexican government behaviors in the investigation of Camarena’s murder led to in 
criticisms from both sides of the border.  As a result, the investigation was less than 
transparent and each side has criticized the other side’s handling of the case. It is also 
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129 PBS.  Frontline: Thirty Years of America’s Drug War. (1995-2010, WGBH Educational 
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Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall - Winter, 1992), pp. 687–703, The MIT Press and the World Policy Institute.  
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209276 on April 20, 2010. 
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widely believed that members of the Mexican police were complicit in Camarena’s 
kidnapping and facilitated the escape of one of the perpetrators to Costa Rica.133  In 
March 1985, Mexican officials notified the DEA that five Jalisco State Police officers 
had been arrested in connection with Camarena’s death, yet the U.S. agents were not 
allowed to participate in the subsequent interrogation of the officers.134   
Therefore, at the time of the murder, the Camarena case received significant 
public attention in the United States. As the next section will show, the DEA—as well as 
other U.S. law enforcement agencies—embraced this case for decades to come as a 
means of justifying U.S. involvement in the Mexican drug war. 
2.  The DEA’s Continued Focus on Camarena and the AFO 
The kidnapping, torture, and murder of “Kiki” Camarena provided a critical 
juncture in the DEA’s historical narrative.  It has come to define the identity of the 
agency as the DEA has taken Camarena’s story and understandably framed it to create 
support for the agency’s mission as well as develop esprit de corps.  While providing a 
sounding board for the agency, the DEA has become path dependent upon Camarena’s 
legacy.  This section analyzes this path-dependent dynamic, as well as the modes by 
which the DEA has demonstrated its near obsession with the Camarena case and with the 
AFO. 
The discussion argues that, following Camarena’s highly visible murder, it was 
necessary for the DEA’s credibility as a law enforcement entity to pursue and capture his 
abductors.  The successes of Operation Leyenda were nearly as significant and defining 
the DEA’s legacy as Camarena’s murder.  The agency’s successes against the AFO in the 
last decade are the composite manifestation of this story.  This narrative has since 
become institutionalized in the annals of the DEA history and has since been utilized to 
                                                          
133 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. “1985–1990,” Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/history/1985–1990.html on April 16, 2010, 63-64. 
134 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. “1985–1990,” 64. 
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create and maintain support for the agency and its mission.135  The DEA’s incremental 
successes with regard to the AFO have further driven the agency to focus on remaining 
members of the AFO.  These incremental increases in success, illustrated by the number 
of arrests, have resulted in what Boas would consider the DEA’s “lock in” to the path of 
AFO prosecution and a relative neglect of the CFO.136 
Prior to the analysis, it is important to understand the logic behind the research 
methods of the section. Much of the information in this discussion was derived from 
media sources and U.S. open indictments of the individuals in detention in the U.S. or in 
Mexico.  There are inherent limitations to obtaining information from parties with a 
vested interest in having the image of their institution viewed in a positive light.  These 
organizations, such as the DEA, hope to garner support for their institutions through their 
publications, which are therefore likely to present a skewed picture of DEA activities.  
However, this thesis uses DEA sources in order to demonstrate that the DEA has been 
focused on the AFO and not the CFO, a focus that the DEA would be unlikely to 
fabricate for purposes of promoting itself. A review of the DEA’s Web site for press 
releases and histories for information regarding both cartels yields a wealth of 
information on the AFO and at the same time, a relative dearth of information regarding 
the CFO.  The U.S. concentration on the AFO is also reflected in the investigating and 
arresting units attributed by either side with the successful apprehension (see Tables 1 
and 2).   
In reviewing DEA statements, it becomes readily apparent that the AFO earned 
the agencies ire from its relationships to Camarena’s murderers. The 1985–1990 history 
of the DEA (written by the DEA) claims that the “1985 torture and murder of Agent  
 
 
                                                          
135 Interestingly, Camarena’s murder also hardened United States’ resolve in its war on drugs with 
First Lady Nancy Reagan’s embrace of the drug-free proclamations of the Red Ribbon campaign 
established in Camarena’s honor. 
136 Boas. “Conceptualizing Continuity and Change,” 34. 
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Camarena marked a turning point in the war on drugs.”137  The history succinctly places 
the perspective of the death of their agent within the context of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency’s motivations as follows: 
Perhaps no single event had a more significant impact on the DEA than 
the abduction and murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico 
in 1985. His murder led to the most comprehensive homicide investigation 
ever undertaken by the DEA, which ultimately uncovered corruption and 
complicity by numerous Mexican officials.138 
The DEA’s focus on the AFO, and on the case of Camarena, has continued to the 
present, as illustrated by the following excerpt drawn from the DEA’s web-site in April 
2010: 
The DEA has systematically pursued members of the AFO since the 
1980’s. Seven brothers and four sisters of the ARELLANO-FELIX family 
inherited the Tijuana Cartel from Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo in 1989, 
after his arrest for drug trafficking. Gallardo has been indicted in the U.S. 
for his involvement in the torture and brutal murder of DEA Special Agent 
Enrique “Kiki” Camarena.139  
Camarena’s legacy has survived not only in DEA rhetoric but also in the form of 
the DEA’s drug war prosecution from 1985 to the present.  The DOJ’s determination to 
pursue the key leaders of the AFO are evident in various sources ranging from statements 
it has issued, to rewards that are offered for information on these individuals and their 
placement on “most wanted” lists.  Nearly all of the high-priority members140 of the AFO  
 
 
                                                          
137 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “1985–1990." Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/history/1985-1990.html on April 16, 2010, 64. 
138 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “1985–1990.” Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/history/1985-1990.html on April 16, 2010. 
139 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “Major Cartel Lieutenants Arrested in Mexico.” June 7, 2004. 
Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/dea/major/united_eagles/ on April 21, 2010.  
140 The U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) created the Consolidated Priority Organization Targets 
(CPOT) in 2002 in an effort to create “a unified list of international ‘command and control’ drug traffickers 
and money launderers.”  While this list was established two years after the starting date of the research for 
this thesis, it still demonstrates the selective targeting of individuals by the various organizations of the 
DOJ. White House.  Office of Management and Budget, 2005. Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget/fy2005/justice.html on May 4, 2010. 
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that have been apprehended by Mexican and U.S. agencies have been a part of focused 
and systematic targeting by the DOJ, driven by its pursuit to dismantle the organization 
that was responsible for the killing of Camarena.   
Camarena’s murder and subsequent investigation focused the DEA’s attentions 
toward members of the Guadalajara Organization (that would later become known as the 
AFO, led by the Arellano-Felix family).  The DEA, in conjunction with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Marshals Service (USMS), the U.S. 
Treasury Department, and various California law enforcement agencies, has pursued 
members of the AFO relentlessly since the death of the DEA agent.  This relentless 
pursuit of the AFO is reflected best in some of the tools with which the U.S. Justice 
Department uses to pursue its members.  Over the years, the Justice Department has 
offered rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the leaders of the 
cartel and has placed images of the individuals on major international fugitive posters in 
both English and Spanish language versions.  The AFO has been the subject of multiple 
reward posters (see Figure 1 below).  In comparison, the Justice Department has only one 
individual from the Carrillo-Fuentes Organization on its major international fugitive list, 
Vicente.141 
As Figure 1 depicts, the specific targeting and reward system has been successful 
in the case of the Arellano-Felix organization.  Seven out of nine individuals have been 
captured following efforts initiated by the U.S. Justice Department and conducted largely 
by Mexican agencies.  It is also important to note that Figure 1 represents only two 
iterations out of many of the DEA’s reward posters.  The following section focuses on the 
historical background of the Enrique Camarena case and its subsequent investigation. 
 
                                                          
141 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “Major International Fugitives.” Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/fugitives/internl/internllist.htm on 19 April, 2010. 
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Figure 2.   Arellano-Felix Hotline Posters.  Wanted posters released by the U.S. DEA 
following updates to the status of numerous individuals.  The image on the left is 
from 2007.  The image on the right is following Eduardo’s arrest in 2008.142 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has demonstrated that Mexican agents have been highly successful in 
capturing AFO leaders vis-à-vis the leaders of the CFO. There are obvious disparities 
between the involvement of U.S. agents in the investigations of AFO leaders when 
compared to the investigations and arrests of the leaders of the CFO.  Eight out of ten key 
leaders of the AFO had some U.S. involvement in their investigation or arrest.143 In 
contrast, none of the CFO leadership captures involved U.S. collaboration. 
The chapter has argued that this U.S. focus can be understood as a path-dependent 
dynamic that began with the 1985 killing of U.S. DEA Special Agent Camarena.  
Camarena’s kidnapping and murder spurred the DEA to focus on the agent’s killers, the 
                                                          
142 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.  U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from 
www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/.../sandiego_afo_poster020607_eng.pdf on April 21, 2010. 
143 These numbers reflect the inclusion of the Coast Guard arrest of Francisco Arellano-Felix in 2006. 
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Guadalajara Cartel and later the AFO.  As a direct result of the Camarena murder, the 
DEA has pursued the AFO disproportionately to the CFO.  The dogged pursuit of the 
AFO therefore accounts for a great deal of the variation that is observed between the 
leaders of these two criminal organizations. 
Importantly, the DEA’s ability to pursue the AFO has not been constant over 
time.  The DEA was not able to fully capitalize on its determined pursuit of the AFO 
leadership until after three significant events in U.S.-Mexico relations: first, the 
establishment of a certification process for foreign countries receiving U.S. aid; second, 
the negotiations and signing of NAFTA; and finally, President Vicente Fox’s election 
that signaled the fall of the PRI and increased cooperation with the United States. The 
analysis, therefore, not only accounts for differences in leadership captures across the two 
cartels, but it also explains across-time variation, toward significant captures of AFO 






Mexico’s prosecution of its part in the war on drugs has yielded disparate results, 
especially when viewed through the lens of cartel leader captures.  Mexican federal law 
enforcement agencies have experienced much greater success in capturing the leaders of 
the Arellano-Felix Organization than they have in the case of the Carrillo-Fuentes 
Organization.  Research conducted for this thesis indicates that this variation is not the 
direct result of any increased military or federal law enforcement deployments to the 
regions in which these organizations operate.  Rather, the variation is best explained as a 
product of the unique history of the U.S. DEA, increased cooperation with Mexican law 
enforcement agencies, and these entities’ ability to exploit the unique management 
structures of the AFO.   
In terms of state security forces’ actions in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, the thesis 
has painted a dismal picture. Understanding the complex nature of Mexico’s security 
system places the current drug war into perspective as it evolves, specifically by 
demonstrating ongoing state ineffectiveness in ensuring the rule of law for the Mexican 
public. For decades, Mexican administrations have deployed the military and federal law 
enforcement agencies in response to crises throughout Mexico.  In the case of combating 
drug cartels, the government has used these agencies to capture the leaders of the cartels.  
Leader captures are considered tangible “successes” that public officials can point to in 
order to garner further support for their operations.  However, Mexico’s law enforcement 
system has historically followed a mandate that runs counter to the intended purpose of 
law enforcement agencies.  Mexico’s police and security systems were created to provide 
security for the political regime while affording impunity for the police, as opposed to 
providing public safety. The same organizations have also been subject to numerous 
rounds of reforms aimed at stemming corruption.  While these institutions may be 
Mexico’s best hope against organized crime and corruption, these changes do not provide 
sufficient explanation for the variation between the leadership arrests of the AFO relative 
to those of the CFO.   
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The analysis gains considerable traction in explaining this variation by turning to 
theories of organizations. Specifically, the thesis finds that, although the lower and 
middle levels of the two cartels appear to be similar in structure, variation exists between 
the CFO and the AFO in the leadership structures, and that this variation matters.  At the 
lower and middle levels of the cartels, these organizations appear to be relatively flat in 
nature.  However, the fact that the Arellano-Felix Organization leadership has been 
largely comprised of the seven brothers and four sisters of the Arellano-Felix family itself 
provides greater opportunities for law enforcement agencies to gather intelligence on the 
leaders.  In keeping the leadership largely within a single family, the AFO has greatly 
increased the quantity of linkages they have in common.  Any arrest by the DEA or the 
Mexican federal government of the cartel leaders compromises the integrity of the 
organization’s leadership.  Early arrests of AFO members on the periphery of the 
Arellano-Felix family have produced large quantities of information on the rest of the 
organization, to include its leadership.     
In contrast, the CFO leadership appears to be less nepotistic and perhaps more 
professional in its structure, given its use of subcontractors to provide a level of 
specialization and expertise to a number of high-risk activities.  Relying upon 
relationships with entities such as Barrio Aztecas and La Linea to supply necessary 
capabilities to conduct their operations insulates cartel leaders from Mexican law 
enforcement operations.  The contracting of services also affords the CFO the ability to 
concentrate its efforts in the activities that are most relevant to the organization without 
expending time and resources performing heterogeneous activities.  The AFO lacks such 
a system and therefore is subject to incurring the costs of those activities.   
The AFO and CFO’s structures and behaviors help explain why the Mexican 
government has been successful in its systematic pursuit of the leaders of the AFO.  
However, these variables do not provide adequate explanation for the disparity between 
the AFO and CFO arrests.  Rather, the structural disparity between the two organizations 
has facilitated the tremendous efforts of the U.S. DEA as they have, by their own 
admission, doggedly pursued the AFO for over a decade. That is, a more complete 
explanation comes as an extension of the DEA’s history of operations within Mexico. 
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There are obvious disparities between the levels of involvement of U.S. agents in 
the investigations of AFO leaders when compared with CFO leadership arrests.  Eight out 
of the ten AFO cases reviewed in this thesis involved the use of U.S. agencies during 
their investigations, compared with none of the high-level arrests of CFO leaders. 
This disparity can be understood using a path-dependent approach, beginning 
with the 1985 killing of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena.  The dramatic kidnapping 
and death of Enrique Camarena has been the pivotal in the formation of the DEA’s 
legacy.  Immediately after Camarena’s death, the high-profile case provided ample 
incentive for the DEA to focus on the agent’s killers in the Guadalajara Cartel. However, 
the DEA’s ongoing focus for twenty-five years on the Camarena case and the 
Guadalajara Cartel’s successor, the AFO, is better understood as the result of a kind of 
lock-in process, whereby the story of the Camarena murder has continued to serve as a 
rallying point for justifying U.S. law enforcement agencies’ focus on the drug war in 
Mexico.  By the agencies’ own admission, Camarena’s death accounts for the agency’s 
tenacious pursuit of the AFO disproportionately to their pursuit of the CFO.  Importantly, 
only after the enabling events of the U.S. certification process, NAFTA, and the fall of 
the PRI represented by Vicente Fox’s election is there sufficient U.S.-Mexico security 
cooperation to allow the DEA to influence the dismantling of the AFO. 
The findings of the thesis have several implications for what we might expect in 
terms of how U.S. drug policy is performed abroad and how it can affect local-level 
variations in law enforcement efforts.  First, the DEA’s dependence on the legacy of 
Camarena’s death suggests that agencies that are established with the mandate to pursue 
justice within the confines of the law are not immune from the influences of the emotive 
reactions that gather public support for such an event.  The analysis suggests that the 
DEA has not worked with Mexican agencies so as to best decrease insecurity or illegal 
drugs from spilling across the border but, rather, that it has focused on the perpetrators of 
a single violent act against one of its own. Furthermore, the DEA’s specific focus on the 
AFO is in fact random: Camarena was not the first DEA agent killed in the line of duty, 
nor was he the last, but he has absolutely been the most influential in terms of 
formulating the direction of the agency’s policy in Mexico.  In the interest of increasing 
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the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. agencies in the “war” against drugs, this thesis 
therefore suggests the need to examine in careful detail the logic by which the resources 
of those agencies are employed, both within the United States and abroad.   
Second, the DEA’s pursuit of the AFO also reconfirms that even “successful 
counter-narcotics efforts provide only limited successes in combating the war on drugs.”  
As the DEA has dismantled the Arellano-Felix family, the AFO continues to reconstitute 
itself to provide more high-priority targets for the DEA.  Despite the loss of four 
Arellano-Felix brothers, the organization remains a powerful influence in the Tijuana 
border area.  While the DEA has remained focused on the AFO, other drug cartels have 
grown in strength and influence throughout Mexico, to include the CFO.  As 
organizations affiliated with the CFO continue to specialize and organize, they become 
more powerful and audacious, as evidenced in the 2010 killings of three individuals tied 
to the U.S. consulate.  However, these killings are also very significant in that they hold 
the potential to become another critical juncture, this time potentially drawing U.S. law 
enforcement attentions not toward the AFO but rather toward the CFO. 
Findings within this thesis allow for projection beyond the two cases of the AFO 
and CFO.  The study’s discussion of the role law enforcement has within Mexican 
society speaks to the inherent challenges of the government to try to introduce these 
forces into society as a protectorate of the people rather than of the political party.  Lopez 
Portillo’s description of the populace’s poor view of the police does not bode well for the 
federal governments’ repeated deployments of thousands of troops and law enforcement 
agents.  As Lopez Portillo argues, the increase in the federal law enforcement agents 
likely exacerbates the population’s already poor perceptions.144  Until law enforcement 
agents in Mexico can demonstrate that they are no longer beholden to political parties and 
have become invested in providing security for the people, they will continue to struggle 
to gain the trust of the populace.   
Finally, the analysis provides insights into the evolution of cartels, specifically, 
increasing insecurity in Mexico arising from the significant professionalization of these 
                                                          
144 Lopez Portillo.  2002, p. 120. 
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organizations.  As is true of the CFO, other major cartels have developed specialized 
enforcement groups, which exhibit expertise in military attacks to levels that rival and 
sometimes outperform even the military.  In fact, a number of these groups consist 
largely of ex-special forces members who have defected from the Mexican military to 
work for the DTOs.  These organizations, such as the Zetas, have become more brazen in 
their attacks on other cartels and law enforcement units, police stations, and even prisons 
in order to secure the release of members of the organization.145 Therefore, as 
policymakers in Mexico and the United States look ahead in search of more effective 
counterdrug strategies, they should take into consideration the highly complex, 
professionalized nature of these cartels. 
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